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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
The Supreme Court Review briefly summarizes important decisions 
rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court.  The purpose of the Review 
is to indicate cases of first impression, cases of significantly affected earlier 
interpretations of North Dakota law, and other potential cases of interest.  
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—WORKERS COMPENSATION—OFFSETS 
WITH OTHER BENEFITS 
TEDFORD V. WORKFORCE SAFETY & INSURANCE 
 
Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) appealed an amended district 
court judgment.1  The district court judgment reversed “WSI’s decision to 
offset Richard Tedford’s federal social security retirement benefits against 
his worker’s compensation disability benefits.”2  The judgment also affirm-
ed an order that awarded Tedford both attorney fees and costs pursuant to 
Section 28-32-50 of the North Dakota Century Code.3  On appeal, Tedford 
sought attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 28-32-50.4  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision in holding that 
WSI erred in its decision to offset Tedford’s social security benefits against 
his workers compensation benefits.5  However, the court reversed the dis-
trict court’s award of attorney fees and costs to Tedford, instead finding that 
the district court erred in its determination that WSI had acted without sub-
stantial justification.6  Finally, the North Dakota Supreme Court denied 
Tedford’s motion on appeal seeking attorney fees and costs.7 
In 1985, Tedford applied for workers compensation benefits after 
injuring his back.8  WSI accepted Tedford’s claim awarding him both medi-
cal expenses and disability benefits.9  Since April of 1989, Tedford received 
 
1. Tedford v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2007 ND 142, ¶ 1, 738 N.W.2d 29, 30. 






8. Id. ¶ 2. 
9. Id. 
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temporary total disability benefits.10  In June of 1990, WSI began paying 
Tedford permanent total disability benefits upon a determination that 
Tedford was permanently and totally disabled.11  In 1989, “Tedford also 
began receiving federal social security disability benefits” (SSDI).12  As 
required under Section 65-05-09.1, the amount of Tedford’s SSDI benefits 
was offset against the temporary total disability benefits he received.13 
Upon the change in classification of his disability status from tempo-
rary to permanent in June of 1990, WSI continued to offset his SSDI 
benefits.14  Then, when Tedford reached his retirement age of 65 years and 
2 months, his SSDI benefits were converted to social security retirement 
benefits automatically.15  Following this conversion, WSI sought to offset 
Tedford’s retirement benefits against his permanent total disability benefits 
by issuing an order.16  Tedford requested that WSI’s order be reconsidered 
upon which an administrative law judge (ALJ) recommended that WSI’s 
order to offset retirement benefits be reversed.17  WSI rejected the ALJ’s 
recommendation and issued an order requiring that “Tedford’s social secu-
rity retirement benefits be offset against his permanent total disability 
benefits.”18 
Tedford appealed WSI’s decision to the district court.19  Initially, the 
district court found that WSI’s decision to offset the benefits was not an 
error and affirmed the order.20  Tedford made a motion to amend the judg-
ment, which was heard by a different judge.21  The second judge reversed 
WSI’s order finding that WSI was not allowed to offset Tedford’s benefits 
and instead directed that as of August 1, 2003, Tedford was to receive his 
full total disability benefits.22  Tedford also sought attorney fees and costs 
pursuant to Section 28-32-50 of the North Dakota Century Code.23  Upon 
determining that WSI’s legal arguments were not substantially justified, 








16. Id. ¶ 4. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 




23. Id. ¶ 6. 
24. Id. 
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In its decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that it reviews 
an administrative agency decision in the same manner that district courts 
review them pursuant to Section 28-32-46.25  On appeal, the case only pre-
sents questions of law, not of fact, therefore Sections 28-32-46 and 28-32-
49 provide that unless the agency order is not in accordance with law, the 
court must affirm the order.26 
On appeal, WSI argues that its decision to offset Tedford’s social 
security benefits against his disability benefits through workers compensa-
tion was not an error.27  The parties did not dispute that Tedford was deter-
mined to be totally disabled in April of 1989, at which time WSI had the 
authority to offset his SSDI benefits against his workers compensation 
disability benefits.28  WSI did not have the authority to offset Tedford’s 
social security retirement benefits against his disability benefits at that time, 
however.29 
In 1989, the North Dakota Legislature authorized the offsetting of the 
social security retirement benefits of injured employees against the employ-
ees permanent total disability benefits through its enactment of Section 65-
05-09.2.30  This statute specifically provided that it was effective for 
workers that retired on or after July 1, 1989.31  Following this enactment, in 
Kallhoff v. North Dakota Worker’s Compensation Bureau,32 the North 
Dakota Supreme Court considered whether the offset statute applied to an 
employee whose federal SSDI benefits were converted to retirement bene-
fits after July 1, 1989, but who had been found totally disabled and began 
receiving benefits before July 1, 1989.33  In Kallhoff, the court held that 
WSI was not allowed to offset Kallhoff’s retirement benefits against his 
workers compensation disability benefits under Section 65-05-09.2.34  The 
court determined that workers receiving total disability benefits anticipated 
and relied on their receipt of unreduced benefits.35  The court further noted 
that legislative history indicates that the legislature did not want to impact 
the expectation of these workers.36  Instead, the court noted that the 
 
25. Id. ¶ 7, 738 N.W.2d at 32. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. ¶ 8. 
28. Id. ¶ 9. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. ¶ 10. 
31. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09.2 (1989)). 
32. 484 N.W.2d 510 (N.D. 1992). 
33. Tedford, ¶ 11, 738 N.W.2d at 32. 
34. Id. ¶ 12. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. (citing Kallhoff, 484 N.W.2d at 514). 
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legislature was concerned with the protection of the workers’ reliance 
interest because it did not provide that it expressly intended to adversely 
affect disabled workers of the type at issue.37  Therefore, the court held that 
Section 65-05-09.2 only applied to workers that were qualified to receive 
workers compensation disability benefits and who turned sixty-five on or 
after July 1, 1989.38 
In 1993, the legislature amended Section 65-05-09.2 to provide for the 
“offset of social security retirement benefits against the benefits of certain 
totally disabled claimants.”39  However, the legislature also provided that 
claimants receiving benefits that were offset by SSDI benefits would con-
tinue to receive at least the same aggregate amount of benefits.40  Addition-
ally, in 1995, the legislature enacted Section 65-05-09.3(2) and created a 
presumption that disabled employees eligible for social security retirement 
benefits were found to be retired and ineligible for workers compensation 
disability benefits.41 
In Gregory v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau,42 the North 
Dakota Supreme Court considered applying this presumption in the case of 
an employee who was totally disabled prior to the statute’s enactment.43  
The court affirmed the district court judgment which had reversed an order 
by WSI that discontinued Gregory’s disability benefits and ordered a rein-
statement of the benefits.44  The court relied on Kallhoff in its analysis of 
whether WSI had a valid obligation to pay Gregory full disability benefits 
past the age of 65.45  The court found that Gregory had a reliance interest in 
full disability benefits beyond the age of 65 and that WSI had a valid 
obligation to pay those benefits.46 
Ultimately, the rule derived from Kallhoff and Gregory by the North 
Dakota Supreme Court is that injured claimants that receive total disability 
benefits before the enactment of the statutory retirement offset or retirement 
presumption have a reliance interest in continued disability benefits and the 
WSI has a valid obligation to pay these continued disability benefits.47  
Therefore, these provisions may not be applied to such claimants and any 
 
37. Id. at 33. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. ¶ 13. 
40. Id. (citing 1993 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 614, § 10). 
41. Id. (citing 1995 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 623, § 1). 
42. 1998 ND 94, 578 N.W.2d 101. 
43. Tedford, ¶ 14, 738 N.W.2d at 33. 
44. Id. ¶ 15 (citing Gregory, ¶ 34, 578 N.W.2d at 110). 
45. Id. ¶ 16. 
46. Id. at 33-34. 
47. Id. ¶ 17, 738 N.W.2d at 34. 
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statutory amendments do not apply retroactively to either abrogate or 
change the obligation of WSI to pay these benefits.48 
In the present case, WSI argued that the decisions in Kallhoff and 
Gregory did not apply because unlike Tedford’s situation which involved a 
guaranteed continuation of benefits in an amount at least equal to that 
received prior to the offset, these cases involved a complete discontinuation 
of all disability benefits.49  However, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
noted that the question at issue was not whether Tedford could still collect 
benefits.50  Instead, at issue was what Tedford had a right to expect and 
what WSI had an obligation to pay upon Tedford becoming totally disabled 
in April of 1989, prior to both the 1989 and 1993 amendments.51 
When Tedford was determined to be totally disabled in April of 1989, 
the retirement offset provision did not exist, so Tedford had a right to 
expect to receive full disability benefits and WSI had a valid obligation to 
pay these benefits.52  However, an artificial offset provision had been 
applied to reduce Tedford’s benefits from WSI.53  If that artificial offset 
provision had not been applied to his benefits, Tedford would have 
expected to receive and would have received full disability benefits.54  
Therefore, upon reaching retirement age, Tedford had a reasonable expecta-
tion that the offset provision would end and he would receive his full 
benefits.55 
The court also noted that WSI had a valid obligation to pay Tedford’s 
full benefits without an offset when Tedford’s SSDI benefits automatically 
converted to retirement benefits upon reaching the age of retirement.56  
Based on these determinations, the court found that the mere fact the 1993 
amendments to Section 65-05-09.2 enabled Tedford to continue to receive 
the same amount of benefits, did not lead to a different result than that 
reached in Kallhoff and Gregory.57  Ultimately, the court held that Kallhoff 
and Gregory controlled and that Section 65-05-09.2 did not reduce 
Tedford’s claim for full disability benefits.58 
 
48. Id. 
49. Id. ¶ 18. 
50. Id. ¶ 19. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 





58. Id. ¶ 22. 
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On appeal, WSI also argued that the district court’s decision that 
“WSI’s legal arguments were not substantially justified” and its award of 
attorney fees and costs under Section 28-32-50(1) were erroneous.59  Under 
Section 28-32-50(1), if an administrative agency acts without substantial 
justification, a court must award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the 
prevailing claimant.60  The North Dakota Supreme Court has concluded that 
Section 28-32-50 “applies to WSI if it denies or reduces an employee’s 
benefits without substantial justification.”61 
In Lamplighter Lounge, Inc. v. State ex rel. Heitkamp,62 the court 
summarized the standard for determining “substantial justification” under 
Section 28-32-50.63  In defining “substantial justification,” the North 
Dakota Supreme Court has looked to the United States Supreme Court’s 
definition of “substantially justified.”64  This definition focuses on a justifi-
cation that would satisfy a reasonable person.65  In this context, a party’s 
position may be incorrect yet still be found to be substantially justified if a 
reasonable person could find that it has a reasonable basis in law and fact.66 
In Rojas v. Workforce Safety & Insurance,67 the court further explained 
the application of Section 28-32-50 by indicating that it only applies in rare 
situations when WSI acts without substantial justification.68  The court 
noted that the purpose of the statute was to provide relief at the state level 
that is the same as that provided by Congress through the Equal Access to 
Justice Act (EAJA).69  Analogous to its federal counterpart, which places 
the burden on the government, the court has placed the burden under this 
statute on the agency “to prove it acted with substantial justification.”70 
Generally, when construing the EAJA, federal courts have found that 
the acceptance of the government’s position by another federal judge is per-
suasive evidence of the position’s substantial justification.71  Furthermore, 
the North Dakota Supreme Court has recognized that the WSI’s ability to 
 
59. Id. ¶ 23. 
60. Id. ¶ 24. 
61. Id. at 35-36 (citing Rojas v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2006 ND 221, ¶ 16, 723 N.W.2d 
403, 407). 
62. 523 N.W.2d 73 (N.D. 1994). 
63. Tedford, ¶ 25, 738 N.W.2d at 36 (citing Lamplighter, 523 N.W.2d at 75). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. (citing Aggie Investments G.P. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 470 N.W.2d 805, 814 (N.D. 
1991)). 
66. Id. 
67. 2006 ND 221, 723 N.W.2d 403. 
68. Tedford, ¶ 26, 738 N.W.2d at 36 (citing Rojas, ¶ 17, 723 N.W.2d at 407). 
69. Id. 
70. Id. (citing Rojas, ¶ 17, 723 N.W.2d at 407-08). 
71. Id. ¶ 27, 738 N.W.2d at 37. 
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convince a district judge of its position’s correctness provides strong 
indication that the position would be accepted by a reasonable person as 
correct and therefore be substantially justified.72  However, even though 
this acceptance of the agency or the government’s position serves as 
evidence of substantial justification, this evidence is not dispositive and an 
analysis of the government or agency’s position is still required.73  The 
district court’s determination of whether the agency acts with substantial 
justification is discretionary and an abuse of discretion standard is 
employed on appeal.74 
In the present case, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the 
district court’s decision that WSI’s actions were not substantially justified 
amounted to an abuse of discretion.75  The lower court proceedings were 
based on unsettled areas of law and WSI presented facially reasonable 
arguments as to the interpretation of the statute.76  Furthermore, the first 
district court decision accepted WSI’s position, which constituted persua-
sive evidence that the position would be found to have a reasonable basis in 
law and fact by a reasonable person.77  Therefore, the court found that the 
district court’s decision that WSI’s position was not substantially justified 
and the court’s award of attorney fees and costs under Section 28-32-50(1) 
were an abuse of discretion.78 
The court denied Tedford’s motion on appeal for attorney fees and 
costs under Section 28-32-50(1) and found the parties’ remaining argu-
ments on appeal without merit.79  Ultimately, the court “affirm[ed] the 
amended judgment, reverse[d] the district court’s order awarding Tedford 
attorney fees and costs under [section] 28-32-50(1), and den[ied] Tedford’s 
motion for attorney fees and costs under [section] 28-32-50(1) for the 
appeal.”80 
Justice Kapsner dissented from the majority’s opinion.81  Justice 
Kapsner noted that the Kallhoff court refused to apply Section 65-05-09.2 
 
72. Id. (citing Rojas, ¶ 17, 723 N.W.2d at 407). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. ¶ 26, 738 N.W.2d at 36-37 (citing Rojas, ¶ 18, 723 N.W.2d at 408; Hamich, Inc. v. 
State, 1997 ND 110, ¶ 44, 564 N.W.2d 640, 650; Lamplighter Lounge, Inc. v. State ex rel. 
Heitkamp, 523 N.W.2d 73, 75 (N.D. 1994)). 
75. Id. ¶ 28, 738 N.W.2d at 37. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. ¶ 29. 
79. Id. ¶¶ 30-31. 
80. Id. ¶ 31. 
81. Id. ¶ 34, 738 N.W.2d at 38 (Kapsner, J., dissenting). 
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of the North Dakota Century Code because of an ambiguity in the statute.82  
Justice Kapsner indicated that the legislature has since clearly stated that it 
intends to apply this section to individuals in Tedford’s situation.83 
In her dissent, Justice Kapsner also disagreed with the majority in its 
determination that Gregory resulted in an impediment to the application of 
Section 65-05-09.2.84  The decision in Gregory held that disability benefits 
could not be terminated under Section 65-05-09.3, but the application of 
Section 65-05-09.2 to Tedford did not terminate his benefits.85 
Justice Kapsner further contended that Tedford did not provide any 
authority upon which to prove that it was not permissible for the offset 
provision to be applied to his benefits.86  After all, as Justice Kapsner noted, 
Tedford would receive the same amount of money he had been receiving—
when his disability benefits were offset by his social security disability 
benefits—when his social security retirement benefits were offset.87  
Therefore, unlike the majority, Justice Kapsner would instead reverse the 
district court’s decision and reinstate the WSI’s decision to “offset 
Tedford’s social security retirement benefits against his disability benefits 
under [Section] 65-05-09.2.”88 
 
82. Id. ¶ 35 (citing Kallhoff v. N.D. Workers’ Comp. Bureau, 484 N.W.2d 510, 514 (N.D. 
1992)). 
83. Id. ¶ 36. 
84. Id. ¶ 37. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. ¶ 38. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
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CIVIL PROCEDURE—MOTIONS FOR A NEW TRIAL—
ARTICULATING THE CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD 
GISVOLD V. WINDBREAK, INC. 
 
In Gisvold v. Windbreak, Inc.,89 Joelle Gisvold appealed a district 
court’s decision to deny her motion for a new trial and dismiss her negli-
gence action against Windbreak, Inc.90  The decision arose after a jury 
failed to find Windbreak, Inc. at fault for Gisvold’s injuries.91  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the district court 
for reconsideration under the correct standard, because the court could not 
determine if the correct legal standard had been applied.92 
While at the Windbreak Saloon & Casino in Fargo, Gisvold claimed 
that she slipped and fell while dancing, which resulted in serious injuries to 
her right wrist.93  Gisvold argued that Windbreak, the owner and operator of 
the saloon and casino, breached its duty to its customers to provide a safe 
dance floor based on the Windbreak’s manager’s admission that he used too 
much wax on the floor, which caused it to become slippery.94  Gisvold 
further claimed that Windbreak failed to warn customers of this dangerous 
condition.95 
In its defense, Windbreak asserted that it was not liable for the injuries 
Gisvold sustained because it did not breach its duty of care.96  Windbreak 
claimed that its manager did not use excessive wax on the floor.97  Further-
more, Windbreak argued that the manager’s testimony regarding the 
amount of wax used was impeached because the manager quit working for 
Windbreak and believed that Windbreak owed him money that he did not 
receive.98 
A jury found that Windbreak was not at fault for the damages being 
claimed by Gisvold and Gisvold moved for a new trial pursuant to Rule 
59(b)(6) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.99  Gisvold claimed 
 
89. 2007 ND 54, 730 N.W.2d 597. 
90. Gisvold, ¶ 1, 730 N.W.2d at 597. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 






99. Id. ¶ 3. 
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that the jury’s special verdict was not justified by sufficient evidence, but 
the district court denied the motion.100 
Upon appeal, Gisvold contended that the district court abused its 
discretion when it denied her motion for a new trial.101  Gisvold argued that 
this denial was “arbitrary, unconscionable, and unreasonable” because the 
court said it would have granted judgment for her, did not weigh the 
evidence, and did not judge the witness’ credibility pursuant to Rule 
59(b)(6).102  Gisvold claimed that the district court should have exercised its 
independent legal discretion and that the evidence only supported a verdict 
in her favor.103  Windbreak contended, however, that even if the court 
asserted it would have reached a different result than the jury, the court still 
found that the verdict was supported by the evidence.104 
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the standard for a district 
court’s consideration of motions for new trials has lacked precision in the 
past.105  Therefore, the court used this decision to “articulate and clarify” 
the correct legal standard for this consideration.106  The standard is as 
follows: 
[A] district court considering a motion for a new trial based on 
insufficiency of the evidence may not substitute its own judgment 
for that of the jury, or act as a thirteenth juror when the evidence is 
such that different persons would naturally and fairly come to 
different conclusions, but may set aside a jury verdict when, in 
considering and weighing all the evidence, the court’s judgment 
tells it the verdict is wrong because it is manifestly against the 
weight of the evidence.107 
In this case, the district court did not issue a written memorandum 
pursuant to Rule 59(f) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
concisely stated the grounds upon which its ruling was based.108  Instead, 
the district court denied Gisvold’s motion orally.109  The hearing transcript 
of the district court’s decision technically complied with the written 
memorandum requirement under Rule 59(f); however, this rule also 
 
100. Id. 




105. Id. ¶ 11, 730 N.W.2d at 601. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. ¶ 16, 730 N.W.2d at 603. 
109. Id. 
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requires that the grounds upon which the decision was based be concisely 
stated.110 
The North Dakota Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the district 
court’s statements manifested uncertainty with regard to the correct legal 
standard.111  Some of the district court’s statements appeared to support the 
verdict and to suggest that Gisvold failed to meet her burden of proof in 
establishing negligence on the part of Windbreak.112  Other statements, 
however, appeared to indicate that the district court incorrectly applied the 
standard for the consideration of a motion for a new trial.113  Finally, some 
of the district court’s statements reflected uncertainty as to the correct 
standard to apply in the consideration of a motion for a new trial under Rule 
59(b)(6) and the court’s oral decision failed to sufficiently explain the 
court’s reasoning in the denial of Gisvold’s motion.114 
The court was unable to determine if the correct legal standard had 
been applied in the district court’s denial of Gisvold’s motion for a new 
trial.115  Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s denial and 
remanded the case to reconsider the motion for a new trial pursuant to the 
correct legal standard.116 
Justice Sandstrom concurred and dissented with the majority’s opinion 
in the case.117  He concurred with the majority’s articulation of the standard 
upon which a new trial will be granted, but believed the district court 
applied the correct standard.118  Ultimately, he would have affirmed the 
district court decision because it appeared that “any alternative standard 
potentially applied by the district court [would be] more favorable to the 
appellant than the correct standard.”119 
 
110. Id. 




115. Id. ¶ 18, 730 N.W.2d at 604. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. ¶ 22. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
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CIVIL PROCEDURE—PRETRIAL JUDGMENTS—DEFAULT 
JUDGMENTS 
IN RE J.C. 
In In re J.C.,120 Z.C. appealed a juvenile court order, which found her 
in default for not appearing at a hearing regarding her parental rights and 
terminated her parental rights to J.C.121  The North Dakota Supreme Court 
held that the juvenile court’s denial of Z.C.’s motion to continue was not an 
abuse of discretion.122  However, the court found that the juvenile court 
erred in its termination of Z.C.’s parental rights because it did not hear any 
evidence that supported the termination.123  Therefore, the court reversed 
the termination order of Z.C.’s parental rights and remanded the case.124 
A social worker with the Cass County Social Services filed a petition to 
terminate the parental rights of Z.C. to J.C., her 11-year old son, in June of 
2006.125  Following the filing of the petition for termination of parental 
rights, Z.C. motioned “to put the true facts as have been testified to 
repeatedly.”126  Z.C. was then appointed counsel and mailed an order on 
August 14, 2006, which set the trial date on the petition for September 29, 
2006.127  Z.C. did not appear at the trial and her counsel asked to be 
discharged upon moving for a seven- to ten-day continuance to appoint new 
counsel.128  The juvenile court referee denied the motion for a continuance 
and found Z.C. in default.129  The referee reasoned that the best interests of 
J.C. would not be best served by a continuance, nor would it improve Z.C.’s 
ability to appear or present a case.130  During the hearing, J.C.’s father 
consented to the termination of his parental rights and the referee ultimately 
terminated both parents’ rights to J.C.131 
On appeal, Z.C. argued that the juvenile court’s decision to deny her 
motion for a continuance to appoint new counsel constituted an abuse of 
discretion.132  Z.C. claimed that despite the likelihood that the continuance 
 
120. 2007 ND 11, 736 N.W.2d 451. 




125. Id. ¶ 2. 
126. Id. ¶ 3. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. ¶ 4. 
130. Id. at 454. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. ¶ 5. 
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would have lasted longer than seven to ten days, the denial of this 
continuance was an abuse of discretion because the proceeding regarded the 
termination of parental rights.133  However, Z.C. received notice over a 
month before the scheduled start date of the trial on August 14, 2006, yet 
did not act until the actual start date of September 29, 2006.134  Therefore, 
the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the juvenile court referee’s 
decision to deny the continuance was “not unreasonable, arbitrary, or 
unconscionable and was not an abuse of discretion.”135 
In her second argument on appeal, Z.C. contended that it was an error 
for the juvenile court referee to find her in default and to terminate her 
parental rights “without hearing any evidence to support the allegations in 
the petition.”136  Z.C. claimed that the court instead relied on the allegations 
included in the petition and argued that pleadings did not constitute 
proof.137  In response, the State asserted that the three requirements for the 
termination of parental rights under Section 27-20-44(1)(b)(1) of the North 
Dakota Century Code were clearly and convincingly supported by the 
evidence.138  Furthermore, the State averred that Section 27-20-44(1)(b)(2) 
allowed the termination of parental rights because J.C. had been out of his 
parents’ home for “450 of the previous 660 nights.”139 
Section 27-20-44(1)(b)(1) of the North Dakota Century Code provides 
that parental rights may be terminated if the State proves by clear and 
convincing evidence that: “(1) the child is deprived; (2) the causes and 
conditions of that deprivation are likely to continue; and (3) the child is 
suffering, or is likely to suffer, serious physical, mental, moral, or emo-
tional harm.”140  With regard to this provision, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court has noted that judicial notice may not be taken of testimony from 
proceedings where termination was not an issue.141  However, when a ter-
mination of parental rights results from a culmination of prior proceedings, 
the court does not have to operate in a vacuum as to the results of the prior 
proceedings and “may take judicial notice of orders in prior proceedings.142  
The court further noted that a court may also terminate parental rights 
pursuant to Section 27-20-44(1)(b)(2) if “the child is deprived and in foster 
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care or in the control, care, and custody of the state for 450 of the previous 
660 nights.”143 
In making its decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that it 
had not yet adopted procedural rules specific to juvenile proceedings.144  
However, the court looked to its procedures regarding the default of parties 
that have appeared, which require “sufficient proof to enable a court to 
determine and grant the relief, if any, to which the plaintiff may be en-
titled.”145  In this case, the court found that no evidentiary basis was present 
to support the termination of parental rights by the juvenile court referee.146  
Therefore, the court held that the juvenile court’s treatment of the pro-
ceeding as a default and the termination of Z.C.’s parental rights were errors 
because no evidentiary support was present in the record to satisfy the 
statutory requirements for termination under Section 27-20-44(1)(b)(1) or 
(2).147  The North Dakota Supreme Court thereby reversed the order, which 
terminated Z.C.’s parental rights, and remanded the case for proceedings 
consistent with its opinion.148  Finally, the court also directed that the juve-
nile court hold a hearing within thirty days of the mandate of this case.149 
Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred in the opinion to address judicial 
notice, pursuant to Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.150  He con-
curred specially to note that some of the court’s prior opinions created the 
impression that “a less formal procedure than that set forth in Rule 201 [of 
the Rules of Evidence] allowed the trial court to consider prior pro-
ceedings.”151  This opinion illustrated, however, that Rule 201’s application 
of judicial notice is more than a mere mechanic exercise.152  After all, if a 
trial judge fails, under Rule 201, to take formal notice of prior proceedings, 
“those proceedings will not become part of the record for review on 
appeal.”153  Based on this standard, Chief Justice VandeWalle believed it 
would be inappropriate to bring the prior proceedings’ record before the 
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court.154  He thought the record was unclear as to whether the juvenile court 
considered the prior proceedings that led to the termination.155 
CONTRACT LAW—CONTRACT INTERPRETATION—FRANCHISE 
AGREEMENTS 
CAPITAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. V. CITY OF BISMARCK 
Capital Electric Cooperative and Montana-Dakota Utilities Company 
(MDU) argued that they were allowed to provide electric service to certain 
customers in the City of Bismarck.156  Capital Electric appealed a court 
judgment which denied appeal of a Bismarck City Commission decision.157  
The Bismarck City Commission decision held that Bismarck’s electric 
distribution franchise agreements allowed MDU, not Capital Electric, to 
provide electric services to customers in the Boulder Ridge First Addition 
in northwest Bismarck.158  MDU appealed a district court judgment affirm-
ing a Public Service Commission (PSC) decision ordering MDU not to 
provide Boulder Ridge electric services.159  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court held that both utility companies are authorized by their franchise 
agreement to provide electric services to Boulder Ridge and that PSC’s 
decision controls the distribution of services in Boulder Ridge.160  The court 
reversed the judgment in Capital Electric’s appeal and affirmed the 
judgment in MDU’s appeal.161 
Bismarck, a home rule city with an ordinance requiring electric service 
providers to have a franchise to provide services within the city, adopted a 
resolution in 1987 which renewed a twenty-year non-exclusive franchise 
allowing MDU to operate an electric distribution system in Bismarck as 
“now, or hereafter constituted.”162  MDU’s franchise did not have any 
geographical limitations.163 
Bismarck granted a twenty-year non-exclusive franchise to Capital 
Electric in 1973 and 1993; Capital Electric’s franchise was different from 
MDU’s because it included a geographic limitation.164  The limitation re-
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Agreement Dated July 5, 1973.”165  The agreement provided that MDU 
would serve customers within an area bound by a heavy dashed black line 
on an attached map; MDU would continue to serve areas surrounding and 
encompassing the City of Bismarck.166  The agreement further provided that 
Capital Electric would continue to serve its existing customers within the 
black dashed line and serve new customers outside the heavy dashed black 
line.167  Additionally, Capital Electric would serve rural areas not receiving 
central station services and other areas specifically identified in the agree-
ment.168  The agreement was subject to cancellation by either party upon 
twelve months notice.169 
The Boulder Ridge First Addition was annexed in April 2005.170  
Capital Electric provided electric service to at least part of Boulder Ridge 
prior to the annexation.171  The Boulder Ridge area is outside of the heavy 
dashed black line on the map attached to the service agreement and was 
located in Capital Electric’s principal service area under the agreement.172  
After the annexation, both MDU and Capital Electric sought to provide 
electric service to the new customers in Boulder Ridge.173 
MDU petitioned the Bismarck City Commission (Commission) in 
August 2006 for a declaration of MDU’s franchise right to provide electric 
service to Boulder Ridge.174  The Commission issued findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in November 2005 on MDU’s petition after the hearing, 
but before a subsequent special meeting.175  The Commission concluded 
that it was authorized to resolve the franchise questions and related 
issues.176 
The Commission explained that both MDU and Capital Electric offered 
different opinions on the meaning of the franchises and the area service 
agreement and the Commission held that the area service agreement was 
ambiguous.177  The Commission considered extrinsic evidence that indi-
cated the parties’ intent that Capital Electric have a limited presence in the 
 
165. Id. 












         
584 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:567 
city and that MDU was to be the primary electric service supplier.178  From 
this evidence, the Commission concluded that MDU was meant to remain 
the primary electric provider in the city for all customers except for Capital 
Electric’s existing customers.179  The Commission did not believe that the 
attached map was meant to be in place for forty years without amendment 
because if that were the case Capital Electric would be the exclusive pro-
vider for all new areas added to the city outside the lines in the original 
Area Service Agreement.180  Instead, the lines on the Area Service Agree-
ment were supposed to move outward as Bismarck grew.181  Based upon 
these findings, the Bismarck City Commission held that MDU was to pro-
vide electric service to new Boulder Ridge customers and existing cus-
tomers were to remain with Capital Electric.182 
Capital Electric brought a declaratory judgment action against 
Bismarck, MDU, and the PSC in November 2005 seeking a declaration of 
Capital Electric’s franchise rights.183  The district court held that declaratory 
relief was not an available remedy and treated Capital Electric’s action as 
an appeal.184  The judge held in a March 2006 decision that Bismarck’s 
interpretation of the franchise was “not arbitrary, capricious or unreason-
able.”185  The court then dismissed Capital Electric’s declaratory judgment 
action and denied Capital Electric’s appeal in June 2006.186 
In September 2005, Capital Electric filed a separate complaint with the 
PSC against MDU under Section 49-03-01.3 of the North Dakota Century 
Code’s Territorial Integrity Act.187  In the complaint, Capital Electric 
sought to enjoin MDU from providing electric services to Boulder Ridge.188  
In a June 2006 split decision, the PSC found that MDU’s extension of its 
facilities into Boulder Ridge “interfered with and constituted an unreason-
able duplication of Capital Electric’s available [Boulder Ridge] facilities 
and services.”189  The PSC ordered MDU to stop extending its electric 
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providing service to Boulder Ridge customers and sell its Boulder Ridge 
electric distribution facilities to Capital Electric.191  The district court 
affirmed PSC’s decision in October 2006.192  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court stayed the October 2006 PSC decision and consolidated it with 
Capital Electric’s appeal.193 
Capital Electric argued in its appeal that the district court erred when 
deciding that declaratory relief was not an available remedy in the challenge 
of the Bismarck decision.194  Capital Electric cited Section 32-23-02 of the 
North Dakota Century Code which authorizes a declaratory judgment action 
for the construction of a franchise.195  Additionally, Capital Electric argued 
that the district court erred by treating the declaratory judgment action as an 
appeal because no statutes authorize an appeal and, in the absence of statu-
tory authorization, declaratory relief is available to challenge the Bismarck 
interpretation of the franchise.196  Finally, Capital Electric argued that it was 
authorized by its franchise to “provide electric services to areas within its 
principal service area, which is [the area] outside the heavy dashed black 
line on the map attached to the area service agreement,” even as those areas 
were annexed to Bismarck.197 
In response, Bismarck and MDU argued that Capital Electric was not 
seeking a declaratory relief because such a claim must seek a declaration of 
rights before the rights have been violated.198  Instead, Capital Electric was 
challenging Bismarck’s interpretation of the franchises.199  MDU and 
Bismarck additionally argued that the line on the map was intended to move 
outward with new areas and that MDU should have exclusive rights to the 
new customers in Boulder Ridge.200  Bismarck and MDU also argued that 
the appeal was authorized by Section 27-05-06(4) and chapter 28-34 of the 
North Dakota Century Code.201  Finally, Bismarck and MDU argued that 
Capital Electric was not prejudiced by the district court’s decision to treat 
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unreasonable was the same in either an appeal or a declaratory judgment 
action.202 
The court explained that municipalities possess only those powers 
granted by either the North Dakota Constitution, statute or as necessarily 
implied from an express grant.203  The court then established Bismarck’s 
authority to grant franchises under article seven, Section 11 of the North 
Dakota Constitution.204  This constitutional provision gives Bismarck the 
power to franchise the construction and operation of public utilities and 
restricts the legislature from abridging such power.205  Furthermore, Section 
40-05-01(57) of the North Dakota Century Code authorizes the munici-
pality governing body to grant and extend franchises for periods of time not 
to exceed twenty years subject to the regulatory powers of the governing 
body.206  In this case, the court explained that if both MDU and Capital 
Electric had franchise rights to Boulder Ridge, the PSC had authority to 
decide whether the services of one would unreasonably duplicate the ser-
vices of the other under Section 49-03-01.3.207 
The court used concepts of contract law in its analysis of Capital 
Electric’s appeal.208  The court explained that a franchise is a contract and 
the interpretation of a contract is a question of law that is independently 
examined and interpreted on appeal to determine if it was erroneously con-
strued.209  The court then offered the statutory basis of contract interpre-
tation in North Dakota.210  The court explained that unless otherwise 
provided, public and private contracts are interpreted by the same rules of 
interpretation.211  Furthermore, the contract’s language governs its interpre-
tation unless the contract is unclear, ambiguous or absurd.212  The purpose 
of interpreting the contract is to determine the parties’ intent at the time 
they signed the contract based upon the writing itself, if possible.213  Words 
in the contract are considered in their ordinary and popular sense.214  If the 
contract is found to be ambiguous, extrinsic evidence can be considered to 
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show intent for an ambiguity, but not to contradict the written language.215  
After establishing these principles, the court analyzed Capital Electric’s 
claim.216 
The court did not decide whether the district court erred when treating 
the action as an appeal; instead the court found that the district court incor-
rectly interpreted the controlling law regarding Capital Electric’s fran-
chise.217  For this reason, the court concluded that Bismarck’s interpretation 
was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.218  The court began by exam-
ining the language of the agreement between MDU and Capital Electric.219  
The plain language of the agreement allowed Capital Electric to serve new 
customers within the heavy dashed black line and provided that Capital 
Electric’s principal service area was the area outside the heavy dashed black 
line, which included Boulder Ridge.220  Bismarck interpreted the agreement 
to mean MDU was the main provider within Bismarck and that the lines 
would move outward as Bismarck grew.221  Furthermore, the court noted 
that Bismarck said it did not intend for Capital Electric to be the exclusive 
electric supplier for new areas of town, but that MDU would serve in that 
capacity.222 
With these considerations, the court found that Bismarck’s interpre-
tation of the franchise ignored the plain meaning of the agreement.223  
Nothing in the plain language allowed either entity to be the exclusive pro-
vider of electric services in Boulder Ridge upon annexation; instead the 
plain language gave both providers a non-exclusive franchise.224  The geo-
graphical limitation in Capital Electric’s franchise and attached map 
specifically authorized Capital Electric to serve Boulder Ridge.225  Further-
more, the court explained that nothing in the plain language suggested that 
the lines on the map were meant to grow as the city grew.226  Instead, the 
service agreement specified that if the agreement was canceled by the other 
party, “all privileges, rights, obligations and restrictions as therein stated 
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shall continue to apply to both.”227  Bismarck’s reliance upon extrinsic 
evidence from the 1960s was misplaced in proving the intent in 1973 and 
1993 because evidence should show the intent at the time of contracting.228  
Capital Electric did not receive its franchise from Bismarck in the 1960s; it 
received it in 1973.229 
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the non-exclusive 
franchises when considered as a whole within the area service agreement, 
authorized both Capital Electric and MDU to provide services to Bismarck 
“now, or hereafter constituted.”230  The court explained that Capital Electric 
was not restricted from serving Boulder Ridge by its franchise.231  The 
effect of both Capital Electric and MDU’s franchises to serve Boulder 
Ridge constituted an unreasonable duplication and was subject to the PSC 
under Section 49-03-01.3 of the North Dakota Century Code.232 
The Court held that in the absence of explicit language providing 
otherwise, interpretation favors the public interest in preventing unreason-
able duplication of facilities while recognizing a municipality’s constitu-
tional right to grant a franchise.233  In this case, Bismarck exercised its 
constitutional right by granting both Capital Electric and MDU a franchise 
for Boulder Ridge.234  The court concluded that Bismarck erred in con-
struing the franchise to preclude Capital Electric from providing electric 
service to Boulder Ridge.235  The court held that both Capital Electric and 
MDU had franchises to serve Boulder Ridge and reversed the district 
court’s judgment in Capital Electric’s appeal.236 
The court rejected many of the arguments in MDU’s appeal because 
these arguments were founded upon the premise that Capital Electric did 
not have a right to serve Boulder Ridge.237  Because both MDU and Capital 
Electric had a right to provide service, the PSC had jurisdiction under Sec-
tion 49-03-01.3 of the North Dakota Century Code.238  The court explained 
that when determining interference with existing services, the PSC must 
look to the existing electric facilities that the rural electric cooperative and 
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the public utility have in the area and determine whether there is a an 
unreasonable duplication of capital-intensive facilities and services by the 
other entity.239  After examining the facilities and services that Capital 
Electric had provided Boulder Ridge, the court held that a reasonable mind 
could have found that PSC’s findings were supported by the evidence and 
the record.240  Therefore, the court ultimately affirmed the district court 
judgment affirming the PSC decision.241 
CRIMINAL LAW—ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE & LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSES 
STATE V. ROGERS 
Joseph Rogers appealed a criminal judgment finding him guilty of 
sexual assault and criminal trespass.242  The North Dakota Supreme Court’s 
holding consisted of two parts.  First, the court found that Rogers’ sexual 
assault conviction under Section 12.1-20-07(1)(b) of the North Dakota 
Century Code was not supported by sufficient evidence of a mental disease 
or defect.243  The court therefore reversed the guilty verdict as to the sexual 
assault charge and remanded the case to dismiss count two of the informa-
tion.244  Second, the court agreed with the district court’s decision to 
prohibit a “lesser-included jury instruction” as to the criminal trespass 
charge.245  As a result, the court affirmed the district court’s criminal 
judgment based upon the guilty verdict for the criminal trespass charge.246 
From the evening of July 20, 2004 through the morning of July 21, 
2004, Rogers was employed at a Minot hotel, where the victim was a 
guest.247  After going to a few bars, the victim returned to the hotel and did 
not have her hotel room key.248  Rogers walked her to her room and opened 
the door using the hotel’s master key.249  The hotel’s master key accessed 
the victim’s room four additional times in the early morning.250  The 
victim’s testimony indicated that “she had no memory from the time she 
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entered her hotel room to some point in the morning when she saw Rogers 
adjusting his clothing.”251 
Rogers claimed that when the victim returned to the hotel, she talked to 
him, including asking him to order a pizza, and they smoked cigarettes 
together.252  According to Rogers, the victim hugged and kissed him, then 
invited him to her hotel room where they engaged in sexual intercourse.253  
Rogers further alleged that the victim instructed him to return to her room 
to wake her later in the morning.254  Rogers stated that he returned to her 
room, where he shook her and touched her private areas while she was 
asleep.255 
Following these events, Rogers was charged with the offenses of 
sexual assault and criminal trespass.256  During his jury trial, Rogers was 
convicted of a class C felony sexual assault pursuant to Section 12.1-20-
07(b) and a class C felony criminal trespass pursuant to Section 12.1-22-
03(1) of the North Dakota Century Code.257 
On appeal, Rogers made two arguments.258  First, Rogers argued that 
the guilty verdict for the class C felony sexual assault charge was not 
supported by sufficient evidence.259  Second, Rogers argued that the trial 
court’s decision to “allow a lesser-included jury instruction on the criminal 
trespass charge” was incorrect.260 
Rogers’s first argument alleged that he could not be convicted of a 
class C felony sexual assault charge under Section 12.1-20-07(1)(b) 
because there was insufficient evidence that “the victim suffered from a 
mental disease or defect.”261  The State argued instead that the victim’s 
intoxication constituted a mental disease or defect.262  Section 12.1-20-
07(1)(b) of the North Dakota Century Code provides: 
1. A person who knowingly has sexual contact with another 
person, or who causes another person to have sexual contact with 
that person, is guilty of an offense if:  
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. . . 
b. That person knows or has reasonable cause to believe that 
the other person suffers from a mental disease or defect which 
renders that other person incapable of understanding the 
nature of that other person’s conduct[.]263 
This section fails to define “mental disease or defect.”264 
The State argued that the victim’s intoxication, which led to uncon-
sciousness, constituted a mental disease or defect.265  The trial court’s jury 
instruction specifically stated that intoxication in and of itself did not con-
stitute a mental disease or defect.266  Neither Rogers nor the State objected 
to this jury instruction itself and the jury instruction became the law of the 
case.267  Therefore, under Section 12.1-20-07(1)(b), Rogers could not be 
found guilty of sexual assault by a rational factfinder and the North Dakota 
Supreme Court reversed his conviction of class C felony sexual assault 
pursuant to Section 12.1-20-07(1)(b).268  Furthermore, the court noted that 
the State could not retry Rogers for sexual assault under the statute based on 
the principles of double jeopardy and remanded the case to the district court 
to dismiss the sexual assault charge in the information.269 
As to his second argument on appeal, Rogers claimed that “he should 
have received a lesser-included offense jury instruction on the class A mis-
demeanor criminal trespass charge.”270  Rogers was convicted of class C 
felony criminal trespass under Section 12.1-22-03(1), which states that 
“knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or remains 
in a dwelling or in highly secured premises.”271  Rogers argued that he was 
guilty of a lesser charge pursuant to Section 12.1-22-03(2)(a) of the North 
Dakota Century Code because the victim’s hotel room constituted an 
occupied structure, not a dwelling.272 
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The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the term “dwelling” 
includes a hotel room because the definition of dwelling includes a place of 
lodging.273  Furthermore, the court determined that Section 12.1-22-
03(2)(a) is not a lesser-included offense of Section 12.1-22-03(1).274  To be 
a lesser included offense, “it must be impossible to commit the greater 
offense without committing the lesser.”275  In this case, it would not be 
impossible for the “‘greater’ offense of trespassing in a dwelling or highly 
secured premises [to take place] without committing the ‘lesser’ offense of 
trespassing in any building, occupied structure, or storage structure.”276  
Therefore, the district court’s decision to not permit the lesser-included jury 
instruction was not an error and the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed 
Rogers’ conviction for criminal trespass.277 
Ultimately, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed Rogers’ 
conviction of class C felony sexual assault under Section 12.1-20-07(1)(b) 
and remanded the case for the dismissal of count two of the Information.278  
As to the charge of criminal trespass, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
affirmed the district court’s conviction.279 
CRIMINAL LAW—MOTOR VEHICLES—SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS 
STATE V. HAHNE 
In State v. Hahne,280 the State of North Dakota appealed a district court 
order that suppressed evidence in the case of Denise Hahne, who had been 
charged with driving under the influence of alcohol.281  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court found that the district court’s decision was based on an 
erroneous view of the law, specifically “that law enforcement must provide 
motorists with an opportunity to avoid temporary checkpoints.”282  The 
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court therefore reversed the suppression order and remanded the case to the 
district court to apply the appropriate legal standard.283 
On August 18, 2006 in Bismarck, the State Highway Patrol operated a 
sobriety checkpoint located at the East Main and Bismarck Expressway 
intersection.284  After failing to stop at the checkpoint, Hahne received a 
citation at 9:50 p.m. from the State Highway Patrol for driving under the 
influence of alcohol.285 
Following a hearing, the district court found that the Highway Patrol 
officers “followed a well prepared operational order,” but suppressed all of 
the evidence obtained by Hahne’s stop.286  The district court based this 
suppression on its finding that no safe and legal way to avoid the check-
point was available.287  The State appealed the district court’s suppression 
order.288 
Upon appeal, the State argued that the district court erred in suppres-
sing evidence of Hahne’s intoxication because the decision was based 
solely on drivers’ ability to see and avoid checkpoints, implying that check-
points must provide a means by which motorists can avoid them.289  The 
State further claimed that this ruling hindered the purpose of sobriety 
checkpoints, which is “to reduce alcohol-related fatalities on [] road-
ways.”290 
The issue before the North Dakota Supreme Court was “whether the 
district court, in granting Hahne’s motion to suppress evidence, relied on an 
erroneous assumption that law enforcement must, as a matter of law, 
provide a legal opportunity for motorists to avoid such checkpoints.”291  
The court noted that “[a] Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a 
vehicle is stopped by police at a checkpoint”292 and relied upon the United 
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Section 39-20-06 of the North Dakota Century Code.  Id. ¶ 5. 
289. Id. ¶ 6. 
290. Id.  Hahne also contended, for the first time on appeal, that the State did not prove the 
effectiveness of the checkpoint.  Id.  However, the North Dakota Supreme Court did not address 
the issue because it was raised for the first time on appeal and therefore not properly preserved.  
Id. ¶ 7, 736 N.W.2d at 486. 
291. Id. ¶ 8. 
292. Id. ¶ 6, 736 N.W.2d at 485 (quoting State v. Albaugh, 1997 ND 229, ¶ 6, 571 N.W.2d 
345). 
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States Supreme Court decision of Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz293 
in its decision.294 
In Sitz, the United States Supreme Court applied the three-part 
balancing test established in Brown v. Texas295 in finding a Michigan sobri-
ety checkpoint program constitutional.296  The three-part balancing test in-
cludes: “(1) ‘a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the 
seizure,’ (2) ‘the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest,’ 
and (3) ‘the severity of the interference with individual liberty.’”297  As to 
the first factor of the Brown test, Sitz recognized that the problem of drunk 
driving and the importance of a State’s interest in eliminating that problem 
could not be disputed.298 
The Sitz Court found that the second factor of the Brown test had also 
been met.299  This factor, which requires an analysis of “the degree to which 
the seizure advances the public interest,” was essentially characterized by 
the Court as requiring an analysis of the “effectiveness” of the check-
point.300  The Sitz Court determined that this effectiveness analysis does not 
necessitate a searching examination to the extent present in the case, which 
required a determination of the “ratio between the number of cars stopped 
and the number of actual arrests.”301  Instead, the Court found that in the 
case of a Fourth Amendment analysis, deference will be given to the 
manner in which a checkpoint is executed.302 
Finally, as to the third factor in the Brown test, the Sitz Court 
concluded that the intrusion resulting from the checkpoint at issue was 
slight.303  The Court acknowledged that the intrusion had an objective 
component—comprised of the stop’s duration and the interrogation’s 
intensity—and a subjective component—characterized as the fear and 
surprise that the stop causes in law-abiding motorists.304  The Court focused 
 
293. 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
294. Hahne, ¶ 9, 736 N.W.2d at 486. 
295. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
296. Hahne, ¶ 9, 736 N.W.2d at 486. 
297. Id. (quoting Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51).  The central concern in balancing these factors 
is “assuring that an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary inva-
sions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field.”  Id. (quoting Brown, 443 U.S. at 
51).  Therefore, this concern requires that a sobriety checkpoint be “carried out pursuant to a plan 
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.”  Id. 
298. Id. ¶ 10 (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451). 
299. Id. ¶ 11 (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54). 
300. Id.  
301. Id.  
302. Id. at 486-87. 
303. Id. ¶ 12, 736 N.W.2d at 487 (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451). 
304. Id. (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-52). 
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on the subjective component and ultimately determined that this intrusion 
was minimal because the stop was executed by uniformed officers who 
were following pre-established guidelines.305 
In making this determination, the Sitz majority noted that the Michigan 
courts had misread the Court’s previous decisions.306  With regard to the 
subjective intrusion, the lower courts had focused on the fear and surprise 
that resulted when drunk drivers became aware of the possibility of being 
stopped at a sobriety checkpoint.307  The Court, however, noted that the fear 
and surprise that is to be taken into consideration is the fear and surprise 
experienced by law-abiding motorists as a result of the stop.308  Ultimately, 
the Sitz Court held that stationary checkpoints, which are visible to motor-
ists from a distance and operated by uniformed officers pursuant to estab-
lished guidelines, do not generate an undue amount of fear or surprise to 
law-abiding motorists.309  Therefore, these checkpoints do not result in an 
unconstitutional subjective intrusion of a motorist’s personal liberties.310 
In addition to its analysis of Sitz, the North Dakota Supreme Court also 
referred to City of Bismarck v. Uhden311 in its decision.312  The court noted 
that its decision in Uhden “did not challenge the constitutionality of the 
checkpoint on the basis of the degree of intrusion into his individual liber-
ty.”313  However, the decision addressed how a checkpoint’s visibility may 
affect an intrusion by noting that this factor is not conclusive in and of 
itself, but is instead “one relevant factor in the analysis of the stop.”314 
In Hahne, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the district 
court’s decision that a checkpoint was invalid because it failed to provide a 
safe and legal means of avoidance, implied that as a matter of law, law en-
forcement was required to provide motorists a way by which to avoid these 
checkpoints or roadblocks.315  Based on Sitz and its progeny, the court held 
that avoidability is not wholly determinative of the “constitutional reason-
ableness of a checkpoint.”316  Instead, it is one factor to be considered in the 
 
305. Id. (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453). 
306. Id. (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452). 
307. Id.  
308. Id. 
309. Id. (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453). 
310. Id. (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452). 
311. 513 N.W.2d 373 (N.D. 1994). 
312. Hahne, ¶ 13, 736 N.W.2d at 488. 
313. Id. 
314. Id. (quoting Uhden, 513 N.W.2d at 378 n.8). 
315. Id. ¶ 14. 
316. Id. ¶ 15. 
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evaluation of the intrusion upon individual motorists’ personal liberty.317  
Therefore, the district court decision was reversed and remanded to 
determine “whether the checkpoint Hahne encountered was constitutionally 
reasonable.”318 
CRIMINAL LAW—NIGHTTIME WARRANTS—INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
ROTH V. STATE 
Todd A. Roth appealed a district court order denying his application for 
post-conviction relief.319  Roth argued that his trial and appellate counsel 
were plainly ineffective for not challenging the nighttime provision in a 
warrant permitting the search of his home.320 
Roth was charged with possession of methamphetamine, possession of 
drug paraphernalia, and the manufacture of a controlled substance by the 
State after law enforcement searched his home with a warrant during the 
early morning hours of August 28, 2002.321  Roth’s counsel filed a motion 
to suppress all evidence discovered in the search arguing that the warrant 
was not supported by probable cause and contained an invalid no-knock 
provision.322  The district court denied the motion.323  Roth then entered a 
conditional guilty plea to the charges, but reserved his right to appeal the 
suppression motion determination.324  Roth, retaining his trial counsel to 
represent him on appeal, again argued to the North Dakota Supreme Court 
that the warrant lacked probable cause and that the no-knock provision was 
invalid, but the Court affirmed the original judgment.325 
Roth filed an application for post conviction relief in January 2005.326  
In his application, Roth raised multiple issues related to the legality of the 
search and claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.327  
The district court concluded that these issues were already raised on direct 
appeal and rejected his application for post-conviction relief.328  Roth 
appealed this judgment and the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the 
 
317. Id. 
318. Id. ¶ 16. 
319. Roth v. State, 2007 ND 112, ¶ 1, 735 N.W.2d 882, 886. 
320. Id. 




325. Id. ¶ 3. 
326. Id. ¶ 4. 
327. Id. 
328. Id. 
         
2008] NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 597 
district court order denying post-conviction relief.329  The court held that 
Roth was barred from raising issues directly related to the issuance and 
execution of the search warrant, but that the district court should have con-
sidered the merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.330  The 
court remanded the case to the district court to examine this claim.331 
The district court considered Roth’s claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on remand by examining the record.332  Roth argued that his coun-
sel failed to raise the issue of whether the police exercised the no-knock 
provision of the warrant.333  He further argued that his counsel failed to 
challenge the nighttime provision of the search warrant both at the suppres-
sion hearing and on direct appeal.334 
The district court found that Roth’s counsel was not ineffective as to 
the issue of whether law enforcement entered using the no-knock provision 
because he adequately raised the issue in his suppression motion reply 
brief.335  The district court found that Roth’s counsel did not challenge the 
validity of the nighttime provision of the search warrant, but the court did 
not decide whether the provision was supported by probable cause.336  
Instead, the district court found that the evidence would have been admis-
sible regardless because of the inevitable discovery doctrine.337  For this 
reason, the district court concluded that Roth did not prove that the evi-
dence obtained from the nighttime search would be suppressed if his coun-
sel had acted differently.338  Therefore, the district court determined that 
Roth did not prove his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and his 
application for post-conviction relief was denied.339  Roth renewed his 
appeal on the grounds that his counsel failed to challenge the legality of the 
nighttime search warrant.340 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees 
criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel.341  The issue 
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fact.342  The petitioner bears a heavy burden to prevail in a post-conviction 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.343  The petition must show that 
the counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness and that the petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient perfor-
mance.344 
To meet the first prong, the petitioner must surpass a strong presump-
tion that his representation fell within range of reasonable performance 
considering the circumstances of the case and show that the errors were so 
egregious as to not comply with the standards set forth by the prevailing 
professional standards and thus the Constitution.345  To meet the second 
prong, the petitioner must show that the results would have been different 
but for the unprofessional errors of counsel.346  Failure to file a pretrial 
suppression motion is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel; instead 
the petitioner must show actual prejudice.347 
Roth argued that he would have prevailed on the suppression motion if 
his counsel had raised the issue of whether it was supported by probable 
cause and that the court erroneously applied the inevitable discovery 
doctrine in the case.348  The North Dakota Supreme Court examined Roth’s 
claim that he would have prevailed if his attorney had raised the probable 
cause issue to determine whether he suffered actual prejudice because of his 
attorney’s actions.349  Rule 41(c)(1)(E) of the North Dakota Rules of 
Criminal Procedure allows a magistrate to issue a nighttime search warrant 
only if there is a showing of probable cause to justify the night search.350  
This heightened burden arises because a nighttime search is a greater 
intrusion than a daytime search.351 
The court has allowed nighttime searches in situations when evidence 
can be quickly destroyed if the warrant is not promptly executed.352  The 
burden requires an officer to allege facts beyond the evidence’s exis-
tence.353  The fact that drugs are easily disposed of or that a suspect holds 
 
342. Id. ¶ 11, 735 N.W.2d at 888. 
343. Id. ¶ 7, 735 N.W.2d at 887. 
344. Id. 
345. Id. ¶ 8. 
346. Id. ¶ 9. 
347. Id. ¶ 10, 735 N.W.2d at 888. 
348. Id. ¶ 12. 
349. Id. ¶ 17, 735 N.W.2d at 890. 
350. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. 
351. Id. 
352. Id. ¶ 22, 735 N.W.2d at 891. 
353. Id. ¶ 21, 735 N.W.2d at 890. 
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odd hours are not sufficient to meet the burden of a nighttime warrant.354  
Instead, the court has held that the necessity for a nighttime search exists 
“where there is a reasonable possibility that the fruits, instrumentalities or 
evidence of crime sought would not be expected to be at the searched 
premises during the day or might be removed or dissipated if the search is 
delayed.”355 
To establish probable cause, Deputy Bitz told the magistrate specific 
information received from a confidential source who had been at Roth’s 
residence and provided information about how Roth manufactured metham-
phetamine.356  Upon this information, law enforcement conducted addi-
tional surveillance that connected Roth to Perry Anderson, a person 
suspected of involvement in drug use and trafficking.357  This information 
contained in the affidavit was sufficient probable cause to justify the night-
time warrant’s probable cause requirement.358  Additionally, the nighttime 
search was necessary to allow law enforcement to catch Roth while in the 
process of producing methamphetamine.359 
The court concluded that because there was sufficient probable cause 
for a nighttime search, Roth would not have prevailed had his counsel 
raised the probable cause issue.360  Because he would not have prevailed 
even if the issue had been raised, Roth did not suffer actual prejudice as 
required for ineffective assistance of counsel actions.361 
The court then examined whether the evidence would have been admis-
sible under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule if no probable 
cause existed.362  The exclusionary rule applies to violations of Rule 41(c) 
of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure.363  If the exclusionary 
rule applies, the court must determine whether the good faith exception is 
applicable.364 
The good faith exception holds that suppression is an inappropriate 
remedy for an illegal search if the law enforcement officer’s reliance upon 
 
354. Id. 
355. Id. ¶ 22, 735 N.W.2d 891 (quoting State v. Richardson, 904 P.2d 886, 890 (Haw. 
1995)). 
356. Id. ¶ 26, 735 N.W.2d at 892. 
357. Id. 
358. Id. ¶ 27, 735 N.W.2d at 892-93. 
359. Id. 
360. Id. ¶ 29, 735 N.W.2d at 893. 
361. Id. 
362. Id. ¶ 31. 
363. Id. 
364. Id. ¶ 32, 735 N.W.2d at 894. 
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the search warrant was objectively reasonable.365  A good faith exception 
inquiry asks whether a reasonably well-trained officer would know that the 
search was illegal despite receiving authorization from a magistrate.366  
There are four specific exceptions to the good faith exception; these 
exceptions provide that reliance is not objectively reasonable: 
(1) When the issuing magistrate was mislead by false information 
intentionally or negligently given by the affiant; (2) when the 
magistrate totally abandoned her judicial role and failed to act in a 
neutral and detached manner; (3) when the warrant was based on 
an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”; and (4) when 
a reasonable law enforcement officer could not rely on a facially 
deficient warrant.367 
The court held that the good faith exception applied because there was 
no evidence that any of these exceptions applied.368  Nothing in the record 
indicated that the issuing magistrate was misled or failed to act in a neutral 
manner.369  The warrant was not facially deficient; Deputy Bitz presented 
particular facts in the supporting affidavit gathered from both an informant 
and surveillance.370  Ultimately, even if there was no probable cause, 
Deputy Bitz’s reliance upon the issuing magistrate’s determination for a 
night-time warrant was justified and the good faith exception would 
apply.371 
The court concluded that Roth would not have prevailed even if his 
counsel had raised the issue of probable cause because the police had 
enough proof to meet their probable cause burden.372  But, even if the police 
did not meet the probable cause burden, the good faith exception would 
have applied.373  Because Roth would have been unsuccessful even if the 
issue had been raised, he did not suffer actual prejudice and therefore did 
not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.374 
Justice Maring dissented from the majority’s opinion and argued that 




367. Id. (quoting State v. Herrick, 1999 ND 1, ¶ 15, 588 N.W.2d 847, 850). 
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good faith exception would not have applied.375  Justice Maring argued that 
nighttime search warrants are allowed in situations in which evidence 
would be disposed of by morning, by use, sale, or removal form the prop-
erty.376  The affidavit did not put forth any facts that indicated that the 
methamphetamine was being produced at night.377  Furthermore, no facts 
were put forth that claimed that the methamphetamine would be destroyed, 
removed or hidden by morning.378  Justice Maring rejected the majority’s 
holding because the mere suspicion that one of the exigencies may happen 
is not enough to justify a nighttime search warrant and does not meet the 
requirement of probable cause.379 
Justice Maring also rejected the majority’s view that the good faith 
exception would apply.380  Justice Maring believed the warrant was facially 
deficient because it lacked any facts which would support probable 
cause.381  According to Justice Maring, Deputy Bitz knew that his affidavit 
did not provide any facts proving that the evidence would be removed or 
destroyed if the search waited until morning and therefore knew that the 
probable cause required for a nighttime search was insufficient.382  For this 
reason, Justice Maring argued that the good faith exception did not apply.383  
Because the nighttime search warrant lacked probable cause and the good 
faith exception did not apply, Justice Maring concluded that the court 
should have reversed the order denying Roth’s motion for post-conviction 
relief because he did not receive effective assistance of counsel.384 
CRIMINAL LAW—PROCEDURE—USE OF RESTRAINTS ON 
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
STATE V. KUNZE 
In State v. Kunze,385 David Kunze appealed a district court judgment 
convicting him of assaulting a correctional officer.386  Kunze argued that 
the district court’s order to physically restrain him with handcuffs and a 
waist belt during his jury trial, violated his constitutional right to a fair and 
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386. Kunze, ¶ 1, 738 N.W.2d at 473. 
         
602 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:567 
impartial trial.387  The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the district 
court’s order to restrain Kunze was not an abuse of discretion and affirmed 
the district court’s decision.388 
On August 12, 2005, Kunze was an inmate at the North Dakota State 
Penitentiary in the administrative segregation unit.389  He was confined in a 
single-person cell and at approximately 1:00 p.m. that day, his cell was 
searched by four correctional officers.390  During the search, the officers 
found and confiscated magazines, which belonged to another inmate, in 
violation of penitentiary policy.391  As a result, Kunze was angry and upset 
and a scuffle occurred, during which an officer suffered a hand injury that 
drew blood.392 
Prior to his trial, the State sought to have Kunze physically restrained 
while the trial was in progress.393  The State argued that this request was 
justified based on the nature of Kunze’s charged offense involving a violent 
act against an officer; “Kunze’s history of assaults and escapes from custo-
dy”; Kunze’s substantial record of threats and assaults upon prison guards 
and other individuals in the penitentiary; and, the highly restrained method 
required to transport Kunze to and from the penitentiary due to his past 
records of escapes and alleged assaultive behavior.394  When Kunze was 
transported to and from the penitentiary, he was restrained through the use 
of leg irons and a belly chain and moved by at least three officers, “two to 
hold him and one to act as a ‘chase person.’”395  However, upon cross 
examination, an officer acknowledged that Kunze was not violent the three 
times he transported him and did not cause any problems while unshackled 
to change clothing for trial.396 
In response to the State’s claims, Kunze argued that the use of 
restraints would imply to the jury that the trial was essentially a “foregone 
conclusion.”397  Additionally, Kunze noted that it was in his best interests 
not to be violent in the courtroom because it would lead to another charge 
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spoke on his own behalf claiming that he had never attacked or threatened 
anyone at the penitentiary.399 
Without providing an explanation for its decision, the district court 
granted the State’s request to restrain Kunze based on the evidence and the 
parties’ arguments, but did not require leg restraints.400  Following this 
decision, the jury trial began.401  The State presented evidence from the 
officers involved in the incident, who claimed that following the confisca-
tion of the magazines, Kunze became upset and yelled obscenities.402  Then, 
Kunze aggressively approached an officer, who then pushed Kunze back 
into the cell, “with his hands on Kunze’s shoulder and chest.”403  One 
officer then testified that Kunze turned his head and grazed an officer’s 
hand with his teeth, which broke the skin and drew blood, and kicked the 
officer.404  The other officers supported this testimony.405 
Following the State’s presentation of its case, Kunze presented evi-
dence in his defense to contradict the officers’ testimony.406  He called an 
inmate to the stand who had witnessed part of the incident and claimed that 
Kunze did not have his false teeth in his mouth at the time that he allegedly 
bit the officer.407  Additionally, the inmate claimed that the officers began 
“roughing Kunze up” when he was handcuffed outside his cell.408  How-
ever, the inmate could not see in Kunze’s cell and thereby had no knowl-
edge regarding whether Kunze bit or kicked an officer.409  Kunze also testi-
fied on his own behalf, claiming that he did not resist returning to his cell 
and was shoved by an officer.410  Kunze claimed that the marks on the offi-
cer’s hand may have occurred when Kunze raised his cuffed hands to block 
the officer’s hands and defend himself.411 
Based on the evidence presented, Kunze was convicted by the jury of 
assaulting a correctional officer.412  Upon appeal of this decision, Kunze 
argued that district court violated his constitutional right to a fair and 
impartial trial by requiring his physical restraint by handcuffs and a waist 
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belt during his jury trial.413  The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the 
case under an abuse of discretion standard of review.414 
In reaching its decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court looked to its 
recent decision in In re R.W.S.,415 and Deck v. Missouri,416 a recent United 
States Supreme Court decision.417  R.W.S. involved a juvenile; however, 
certain principles set forth in the case were applicable.418  In Deck, which 
was relied upon in the R.W.S. decision, the United States Supreme Court 
held that in general, the United States Constitution “prohibits the use of 
visible shackles on a convicted offender during the penalty phase of a capi-
tal case.”419  However, the use of shackles can be justified if an essential 
state interest is present and specific to the particular defendant on trial, such 
as security.420 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the use of physical 
restraints on criminal defendants results in prejudice.421  This sight of a de-
fendant in shackles can cause the jury to see the defendant as a dangerous, 
guilty individual from the beginning of the trial, thereby undermining the 
presumption of innocence in the factfinding process.422 
Additionally, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of 
restraints that are visible to a jury.423  However, this right is not absolute 
and can be overcome by a trial court’s determination that the restraints are 
justified by an essential state interest specific to a particular trial, such as 
security or escape prevention.424  Therefore, before restraints may be used 
on a defendant, a trial court must make a case-specific determination, which 
takes into account the “special circumstances and particular concerns 
related to the defendant on trial.”425  In R.W.S., the North Dakota Supreme 
Court noted some factors that a trial court should take into account, namely 
the defendant’s physical condition, temperament, and record; the desperate-
ness of the defendant’s situation; the security of the courtroom and 
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courthouse; and the availability and adequacy of less prejudicial means of 
security.426 
In making its determination, an evidentiary hearing may take place to 
resolve factual disputes, but is not required.427  If a trial court determines 
that restraints are necessary, only those restraints that are necessary are 
allowed to limit potential prejudice.428  The trial court should contemplate 
whether less restrictive or prejudicial methods could be used.429  Further-
more, to provide for potential appellate review, the trial court must, at a 
minimum, articulate its reasons for restraining the defendant on the 
record.430 
The district court held an evidentiary hearing immediately prior to 
Kunze’s trial regarding the use of restraints and determined, based on the 
evidence presented, that handcuffs and waist restraints were appropriate.431  
The district court did not articulate its reasoning as to the appropriateness of 
the restraints on the record.432  However, the justification for added security 
measures was apparent on the record and the court tried to minimize 
prejudice by requiring that the waist restraint be placed beneath Kunze’s 
clothing.433 
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that its decision in R.W.S. had 
not been decided at the time of Kunze’s trial.434  Therefore, the district court 
did not have this decision to use as guidance in its determination of the 
appropriateness of the restraints.435  The court further acknowledged that in 
the wake of R.W.S., district courts are required to make case-specific find-
ings and explain, in more detail than present in this case, the rationale for 
the decision to use restraints.436  However, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
held that the record contained sufficient facts and reasoning to justify the 
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CRIMINAL LAW—SEXUAL ASSAULT—DETERMINING THE 
EXTENT OF FORCE REQUIRED 
STATE V. VANTREECE 
A jury found Alexander Vantreece guilty of gross sexual imposition 
pursuant to Section 12.1-20-03(1)(a) of the North Dakota Century Code and 
a criminal judgment was entered against him, which he appealed.438  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court held that substantial evidence had not been 
presented upon which the jury could reasonably find that “Vantreece com-
pelled the complainant to submit to a sexual act by force.”439  Therefore, the 
court reversed the criminal judgment and remanded the case to enter the 
judgment of acquittal.440 
The incident upon which Vantreece was charged occurred at his ex-
wife’s apartment during the morning of August 15, 2005.441  The complain-
ant was the sister-in-law of Vantreece’s ex-wife and knew Vantreece.442  
When the incident occurred, the complainant and her infant son were vis-
iting Vantreece’s ex-wife.443  Vantreece’s ex-wife went to run errands and 
took the complainant’s son with her, while the complainant remained at the 
ex-wife’s apartment.444  After the ex-wife left, the complainant laid down in 
a bedroom and was having trouble falling asleep when Vantreece entered 
the room.445  Vantreece tried to put the complainant to sleep by laying down 
next to her and rocking her, which he had done on prior occasions.446  
Vantreece then left the room but returned a few minutes later.447  The 
complainant pretended to be asleep as Vantreece laid down behind her 
facing in the same direction.448 
The complainant then alleged that Vantreece cut a hole in the pajama 
pants she was wearing.449  The complainant did not say anything to 
Vantreece and testified that Vantreece attempted to penetrate her vagina 
with his penis but was unsuccessful.450  He then left the room; when he re-
turned, he pulled her pants down further and again unsuccessfully attempted 
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to penetrate her again while she continued to pretend to sleep.451  Vantreece 
left the room once again and when he returned a few seconds later, he suc-
cessfully penetrated her vagina with his penis, which the complainant 
testified felt lubricated.452  According to the complainant, Vantreece then 
wiped her off with tissues, pulled her pants up and exited the room.453  The 
complainant continued to feign sleep and waited approximately fifteen 
minutes before leaving the room so Vantreece would not know that she was 
awake.454  The complainant then went outside, where she was joined by 
Vantreece.455  The two of them had a cigarette together and Vantreece told 
her that his ex-wife wanted the complainant to take a shower before she 
returned home.456  The complainant took a shower but only washed her hair 
in order to preserve the evidence.457  The complainant then informed 
Vantreece’s ex-wife about what had happened and his ex-wife drove the 
complainant to the hospital where she was examined.458 
The Fargo Police Department conducted an investigation and initially 
charged Vantreece with gross sexual imposition pursuant to Section 12.1-
20-03(1)(e) of the North Dakota Century Code.459  This class A felony 
charge was based on the allegation that Vantreece engaged “in a sexual act 
with a person who suffer[ed] from a mental disease or defect rendering her 
incapable of understanding the nature of her conduct.”460  However, this 
charge was later amended to charge Vantreece pursuant to Section 12.1-20-
03(1)(a), which provided that he “engaged in a sexual act with another, or 
caused another to engage in a sexual act, [by] compell[ing] the victim to 
submit by force.”461  Following a jury trial, Vantreece was found guilty and 
convicted of “‘class A’ felony gross sexual imposition.”462 
On appeal, Vantreece argued that the gross sexual imposition charge 
was not supported by sufficient evidence.463  Vantreece claimed that the 
prosecutor overreached by repeatedly suggesting that the mental disease or 
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The record contained evidence indicating that the defendant knew of 
the complainant’s mental limitations.465  Vantreece told a Fargo Police 
Department detective that he knew that the complainant was “a vulnerable 
adult” with the “education of an eighth grader.”466  However, Vantreece 
argued that the prosecutor’s argument as to the complainant’s mental abili-
ties was both prejudicial and irrelevant.467  He founded this argument on the 
fact that he was charged with engaging in a sex act by force, not engaging 
in a sex act with a person suffering from a mental disease or defect.468 
The North Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged that Vantreece 
correctly noted that the prosecutor bore the burden of proving that the vic-
tim had been compelled to submit through force.469  However, the court 
concluded that the prosecutor’s argument was not improper or prejudicial 
because the record contained evidence pertaining to the “complainant’s 
diminished mental capacity.”470  The court further noted that evidence of a 
complainant’s mental capacity was relevant in determining the amount of 
force necessary to compel the victim to engage in a sexual act.471 
Vantreece next argued that there was insufficient evidence of force to 
convict him of compelling the complainant by force to engage in a sexual 
act pursuant to Section 12.1-20-03(1)(a) of the North Dakota Century 
Code.472  This section of the code provides that a person is guilty of an 
offense if he or she “compels the victim to submit by force or by threat of 
imminent death, serious bodily injury, or kidnap[p]ing, to be inflicted on 
any human being.”473 
In its decision, the North Dakota Supreme court stressed that the State 
was required to prove that Vantreece compelled the complainant to have 
sex with him by exerting force upon her.474  If the State failed to establish 
force, Vantreece would not be guilty of a crime under Section 12.1-20-
03(1)(a).475  The court further noted that mere evidence of the complain-
ant’s acquiescence in the sexual act, based on her past acquiescence in 
sexual advances, was not sufficient to meet this burden of proof.476 
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In the present case, the record lacked sufficient evidence to establish 
that Vantreece compelled the complainant to have sex with him by exerting 
physical action or force over her.477  Although Vantreece ripped a hole in 
the complainant’s pants, he left the room two times before finally having 
sex with her.478  Under these circumstances, the mere evidence that 
Vantreece ripped a hole in the complainant’s pants was not a sufficient 
finding of force by which to compel the complainant to submit to engaging 
in a sexual act.479 
The North Dakota Supreme Court compared this case to Jiminez v. 
State,480 a Texas Court of Appeals case, which reversed a sexual assault 
conviction.481  Similar to the present case, the complainant in Jiminez 
feigned sleep during an alleged sexual assault.482  The trial court in Jiminez 
found the alleged attacker guilty, but the conviction was reversed by the 
appellate court.483  On appeal, the court found an absence of threats or the 
use of force or violence, because the attacker fled immediately upon hearing 
the complainant cough and realizing that the complainant may be aware of 
what was happening.484  Furthermore, as in the present case, no evidence 
was presented as to the use of force or threats of force or violence on the 
part of the alleged attacker.485 
The court also looked to the Michigan Supreme Court case of People v. 
Patterson,486 in which a sexual assault conviction was reversed based on 
insufficient evidence of force or coercion.487  In Patterson, the defendant 
touched the complainant without her consent while she was sleeping.488  
The Michigan Supreme Court refused to expand the definition of force to 
include this type of conduct because this type of conduct was already 
provided for under a different section of the statute.489  The court explained 
that the legislature’s intention in making the statute at issue in the case was 
to distinguish between sexual assaults involving force or coercion and those 
involving physically and mentally incapacitated victims.490 
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Unlike Patterson, the complainant in the present case was not actually 
asleep, she pretended to be asleep.491  Furthermore, the complainant ad-
mitted that Vantreece did not threaten her, force her down or restrain her to 
prevent her from moving or fleeing.492  Instead, the sexual act was accom-
plished by Vantreece without compelling the complainant through the use 
of force or threats.493  In this case, the prosecutor could have chosen to 
charge Vantreece under either Section 12.1-20-07(1)(a) or 12.1-20-
03(1)(a)(c) of the North Dakota Century Code, neither of which requires a 
finding of force.494  However, through its discretion, the prosecutor chose to 
charge Vantreece under Section 12.1-20-03(1)(a), which required that it be 
proven that Vantreece compelled the complainant to submit to the sexual 
act by force.495 
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that Vantreece may have 
willfully taken advantage of the complainant, whom he knew to be vulner-
able.496  However, the State failed to present substantial evidence upon 
which it could be reasonably concluded that Vantreece compelled the com-
plainant to submit to a sexual act by force or threat under Section 12.1-20-
03(1)(a).497  Therefore, the court reversed the criminal judgment against 
Vantreece and remanded the case for the entry of the judgment of acquit-
tal.498 
Justice Crothers concurred with the majority’s decision.499  In his con-
currence, Justice Crothers outlined North Dakota’s sexual offense statutory 
scheme in Section 12.1-20 of the North Dakota Century Code.500  Within 
this statutory scheme, Justice Crothers noted that the act of using force to 
compel a victim to submit is perceived as more serious than many other 
sexual offenses.501  Justice Crothers noted, in agreement with the majority, 
that the mere ripping of the complainant’s pants was not sufficient evidence 
of the use of force to compel the complainant to submit.502  Justice Crothers 
further acknowledged that a decision in the alternate would essentially 
nullify the legislature’s intent to increase the punishment for sexual 
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offenses based on the level or type of violence accompanying the 
offense.503 
Justice Kapsner dissented with the majority’s decision and was joined 
by Justice Maring in her conclusion that the force involved in the noncon-
sensual sexual penetration that occurred was sufficient under Section 12.1-
20-03(1)(a).504  Justice Kapsner noted that “force” is defined by statute as 
“physical action” and the State need only meet this definition, not prove 
threat of death or other serious bodily injury.505 
In her dissent, Justice Kapsner further indicated that the evidence was 
sufficient to uphold the jury verdict.506  Justice Kapsner noted that a rational 
factfinder could have concluded that Vantreece’s physical actions, 
including ripping the complainant’s pants, forcing himself upon her without 
consent and lubricating himself, met Section 12.1-20-03(1)(a)’s require-
ments.507  Justice Kapsner further argued that the cases relied upon by the 
majority for their factual similarities are unpersuasive based on legal 
dissimilarities.508  In Jiminez, the appellate court relied on the definition of 
force as provided in case law, while the jury in the present case was 
instructed to apply the statutory definition of force.509  Additionally, in 
Patterson, Michigan’s statutory definition of force is quite dissimilar from 
North Dakota’s statutory definition, so as to preclude any persuasive effect 
of the case.510 
Justice Kapsner indicated that the majority decision created a danger-
ous legal precedent by either requiring that it be proven that the victim 
resisted the attacker or that the force used by the attacker was meant to 
overcome the victim.511  Justice Kapsner argued that the force present in 
this case, the penetration of a non-consenting victim, constituted sufficient 
force.512  Justice Kapsner further noted that the determination of sufficiency 
of the force was an issue for the jury to decide and that the charge of gross 
sexual imposition is not based on the victim’s resistance, but is instead 
based on the attacker’s conduct.513  Furthermore, requiring a victim to resist 
an attacker could lead to death or serious bodily injury and an attacker’s 
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conduct should not be excused simply because the victim does not protect 
herself as a reasonable person would have in the eyes of the court.514 
Finally, Justice Kapsner stressed that the court’s use of the word 
“acquiesce” implied that a woman who pretends to sleep during a sexual 
assault will not be found to be victimized unless she does more.515  Justice 
Kapsner argued that a sleeping woman should not be allowed to be victim-
ized simply because she is acquiescing.516  Additionally, the determination 
of whether or not a victim has in fact been victimized should remain within 
the province of the jury as the fact-finders.517  In this case, the jury found 
that the complainant did not acquiesce in engaging in the sexual act with 
Vantreece; instead, she was compelled to do so.518  Therefore, Justice 
Kapsner argued that there was sufficient evidence to support Vantreece’s 
conviction for gross sexual imposition and would have affirmed the 
judgment of the district court.519 
CRIMINAL LAW—SEXUAL ASSAULT—RETROACTIVE 
APPLICATION OF AN ELEMENT OF AN OFFENSE 
STATE V. FLATT 
Lucas Flatt appealed a district court judgment and order denying his 
motion to vacate a jury verdict for gross sexual imposition and dismiss the 
charge.520  Flatt argued that a different version of the law should have been 
applied by the district court.521  The North Dakota Supreme Court con-
cluded that Flatt had been appropriately charged based on the law that was 
in effect when the crime took place, thereby affirming the district court’s 
decision.522 
On June 25, 2005, Flatt was charged under Section 12.1-20-03(3) of 
the North Dakota Century Code with gross sexual imposition.523  The 
charge stemmed from an incident that took place on December 27, 2004 
whereby “Flatt engaged in a sexual act with a woman who was under 
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fifteen years old.”524  In the Information, Flatt was charged under the law in 
effect at the time the crime occurred.525 
The gross sexual imposition law was subsequently amended on April 
12, 2005 and became effective on August 1, 2005.526  The amended version 
of Section 12.1-20-03(3) provided an increased offense gradation from “a 
class A felony to a class AA felony if the actor was more than five years 
older than the victim at the time of the crime.”527  Section 12.1-20-01(3) 
was also amended by the North Dakota Legislature to provide that if an 
act’s criminality depends on the age of the victim, the actor is only guilty of 
an offense if the actor was more than four years older than the victim when 
the crime occurred.528  This new provision thereby limited the conduct that 
can be classified as criminal and the determination of the age of the actor in 
relation to the victim were required to establish that a criminal act occurred 
and determined the gradation of the offense.529  The information was not 
amended to reflect these amendments.530 
On January 13, 2006, the jury returned a guilty verdict against Flatt.531  
On March 28, 2006, Flatt filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3)(B) 
of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure.532 Flatt claimed that 
through its amendments, the legislature changed the crime’s penalty and 
added an additional element, specifically the relation between Flatt’s age 
and the victim’s age.533  Flatt argued that the amended law should be 
applied retroactively and that the State must prove and the jury must find 
that Flatt was more than four years older than the victim to convict him of 
the crime of gross sexual imposition.534  Because the jury did not find 
Flatt’s age in relation to the victim’s, Flatt argued that the information had 
to be dismissed.535  Further, the motion indicated that Flatt was “more than 
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denied the motion on June 20, 2006 and entered its judgment on October 
31, 2006, thereby sentencing Flatt to a class C felony.537 
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Flatt argued that his 
case must be dismissed based on the State’s failure to prove an essential 
element of the offense to the jury, his age in relation to the victim’s age.538  
Conversely, the State argued that the amendment’s age-in-relation-to-the-
victim-provision is not an essential element of the offense; instead, it is 
merely a mitigating factor.539 
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the provision was an 
essential element of the offense of gross sexual imposition, but was not an 
element on the date that Flatt’s offense was committed because it was prior 
to the amendment’s effective date.540  Pursuant to Section 12.1-20-03(1)(d) 
of the North Dakota Century Code in effect prior to the 2005 amendments, 
the State was required to allege and prove that: “(1) on or about the date 
alleged in the information, in the county and state alleged in the informa-
tion, the defendant willfully engaged in a sexual act with the victim, and (2) 
the victim was less than fifteen years old.”541  Following the effective date 
of the 2005 amendments, the age-in-relation-to-the-victim provision was 
added to the general provisions of sex crimes, specifically Section 12.1-20-
01.542  Through the inclusion of this provision, the amendments essentially 
added a new element to Section 12.1-20-03(1)(d), which a jury must find 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.543 
Because the age-in-relation provision was construed as an essential 
element of the crime, the court had to determine whether the amendments 
applied in Flatt’s case.544  Therefore, the issue before the court was one of 
both legislative intent and statutory construction.545  The court found that 
Flatt’s claim failed because elements of an offense could not be retro-
actively applied without the legislature’s express approval.546 
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Generally, statutory provisions are not retroactively applied without the 
legislature’s express approval or declaration of such application.547  Retro-
active application is disfavored because it places new legal responsibilities 
on past conduct.548  However, in State v. Cummings,549 the North Dakota 
Supreme Court created an exception to the general rule against retroactivity 
when it is necessary to prevent an unjust result.550 
In Flatt’s case, a lesser penalty of a class C felony was imposed on 
Flatt in accordance with the Cummings exception.551  In the alternative, 
Flatt argued that the exception required that an essential element be retro-
actively applied to his case.552  The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed 
with this argument by refusing to expand the narrow exception it created in 
Cummings to “include the retroactive application of an additional element 
of the offense” without an express declaration of the legislature’s intent to 
do so.553  Instead, the court held that “a defendant is properly charged with 
a crime when the charging document alleges each and every essential 
element of the offense in effect on the date the crime occurred.”554 
Finally, Flatt argued that he was entitled to relief through an arrest of 
judgment or a dismissal of his case.555  However, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court did not reach this issue.556  The court concluded that the 
Information properly charged Flatt with the correct elements of the offense 
as of the date of the offense.557  Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
affirmed the district court’s decision and order denying Flatt’s motion to 
dismiss.558 
Justice Sandstrom specially concurred in the decision to address the 
judicial branch’s claimed unconstitutional invasion of the legislative 
branch.559  Justice Sandstrom noted that Section 1-02-10 of the North 
Dakota Century Code requires an express declaration by the legislature to 
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apply any part of the code retroactively.560  However, the majority refer-
enced an exception to this general bar against retroactivity even though no 
constitutional infirmity has been cited regarding Section 1-02-10.561  As a 
result, the court does not have the authority to create an exception effec-
tively amending Section 1-02-10; if the section is to be changed, it is the 
function of the legislature to do so.562  For the court to act otherwise would 
be a violation of the basic principle of separation of powers.563 
CRIMINAL LAW—STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND 
INTERPRETATION—DEFINING “INVOLVED” DISTRIBUTION 
STATE V. DENNIS 
In State v. Dennis,564 Douglas Dennis appealed a conditional plea of 
guilty for “[the] possession of marijuana with intent to deliver within one 
thousand feet of a school.”565  The Supreme Court of North Dakota held 
that under the plain language of Section 19-03.1-23.1(1)(a) of the North 
Dakota Century Code, enhancement only exists for the offense of “manu-
facture and distribution of a controlled substance within one thousand feet 
of a school.”566  The court reversed the district court’s judgment and 
remanded the case for resentencing as a class B felony pursuant to Section 
19-03.1-23(1)(b) of the North Dakota Century Code.567 
Following a search of his residence, Dennis was arrested in February of 
2006 for possession and intent to distribute marijuana within one thousand 
feet of a school.568  Prior to the arrest, Detective Paul Olson applied for a 
search warrant to search Dennis’ residence near Grimsrud Elementary 
School.569  At the probable cause hearing, Detective Olson testified that 
probable cause for the search warrant was based on tips and surveillance of 
Dennis’ residence.570  Initially, Detective Olson received a tip that Dennis 
was selling large amounts of marijuana from his residence.571  Detective 
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Olson received an additional tip that a “‘shipment’ had arrived at Dennis’ 
home.”572  Officers also conducted surveillance of Dennis’ residence.573 
Based upon the foregoing tips and surveillance, Detective Olson’s 
search warrant application for Dennis’ residence was granted.574  Upon 
searching Dennis’ residence, officers found less than one hundred grams of 
marijuana consisting of eighteen individually wrapped bags, each of which 
contained nearly thirty grams of the drug.575  Additionally, the officers 
found “cash, money orders, smoking devices, a box of sandwich bags, an 
envelope with ‘pay/owe information,’ and scales.”576 
Dennis claimed that the offense as charged did not exist under North 
Dakota law and moved that the charge be reduced.577  However, “the dis-
trict court denied the motion.”578  Dennis accepted an oral conditional guilty 
plea at the change of plea hearing, which reserved his right to appeal.579  
Dennis was sentenced to a ten-year prison term following the State’s 
sentencing recommendation, although all but six months of the term was 
suspended for five years.580  Dennis was placed on house arrest for the six-
month term and electronically monitored.581 
On appeal, Dennis argued that the offense for which he was charged, 
“possession of marijuana with intent to deliver within one thousand feet of 
a school” does not exist under North Dakota law.582  Dennis claimed that 
controlling language in the aggravating factor provision under Section 19-
03.1-23.1(1)(a) of the North Dakota Century Code for offenses committed 
near schools is “manufacture” and “distribution.”583  Dennis argues that this 
language requires “an actual, constructive, or attempted transfer,” not sim-
ply possession with the intent to deliver and that any statutory ambiguity be 
resolved in his favor.584 
The State, on the other hand, argued that the controlling language in the 
statute is “involved.”585  The State applied the dictionary definition to this 
term, which defines it in the present tense as including “as a necessary 
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circumstance, condition, or consequence.”586  In accordance with this defi-
nition, the State argued that the offense of possession with the intent to 
deliver involved the distribution of a controlled substance.587  Furthermore, 
the State contended that Dennis’ reasoning would produce an absurd result, 
namely that the same penalty would be applied to his charge of possession 
of personal consumption and his charge of possession with the intent to 
deliver it to another person.588 
The controversy in this case, as indicated by the North Dakota Supreme 
Court, centered around the terms “involved,” “manufacture,” and “distribu-
tion.”589  The terms “manufacture” and “distribution” were defined by 
statute, but the term “involved” was not.590  The court noted that “involved” 
is defined in the dictionary as “‘implicated, affected, or committed.’”591  
This definition differed from the State’s definition of the present tense of 
“involved” and the State urged the court to adopt the broad interpretation of 
the term “involved” used by the federal courts.592 
In United States v. McKenney,593 the United States Supreme Court 
interpreted the term “involved” broadly.594  The Court determined that the 
term “involved” extended the focus of the controlled substance law beyond 
the precise offense at issue and encompassed other offenses which were 
“related to or connected with such conduct.”595  However, the Court limited 
this broad interpretation by requiring that for an offense to be included 
under the “involving” language, the relationship between the offense “must 
not be too remote or tangential.”596 
Dennis argued that McKenney dealt with a very narrow issue regarding 
only whether the inchoate offense of conspiracy involved possession with 
the intent to distribute.597  The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed by con-
cluding that inchoate offenses such as conspiracy often encompass broader 
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The North Dakota Supreme Court ultimately determined that the issue 
before the court was “whether possession with intent to deliver involved the 
manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance.”599  First, the court 
determined that Section 19-03.1-23.1(1)(a) supported Dennis’ position that 
the school zone aggravating factor did not apply to him because this factor 
only applied if the offense actually “was the manufacture or distribution of 
a controlled substance.”600  Second, the court found that Sections 19-03.1-
23 and 19-03.1-23.1 lacked parallel language and concluded that the 
inclusion of the terms “manufacture” and “distribution” impliedly excluded 
the intent to deliver.601  Third, the court decided that the defendant had not 
yet distributed a controlled substance so the mere possession of the sub-
stance did not “involve” its distribution; it only indicated an intent to do 
so.602  The court further noted that if the legislature had intended the offense 
of possession with the intent to deliver to be subjected to Section 19-03.1-
23.1’s aggravating factors, it would have done so.603  Ultimately, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court held that the State’s request to broadly apply the 
term “involved” to Dennis’ charged offense was unreasonable.604  There-
fore, the court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case 
for “resentencing as a class B felony.”605 
EVIDENCE—EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY—CHILD VICTIM OF 
SEXUAL ASSAULT 
STATE V. TIBOR 
In State v. Tibor,606 Art Tibor appealed a district court judgment 
finding him “guilty of two counts of gross sexual imposition.”607  Tibor ar-
gued that the district court’s decision to allow expert witness testimony, 
allow an expert witness to “vouch for the victim’s credibility,” and allow 
testimony that was cumulative and hearsay was an abuse of discretion.608  
Additionally, Tibor argued that his conviction was not supported by 
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sufficient evidence.609  The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed with 
Tibor’s arguments and affirmed the district court’s decision.610 
On December 9, 2005, a school counselor met with Jane Doe, who was 
eleven years old.611  Doe had given the counselor a note stating that she 
needed to talk to someone about something that had been happening since 
she was in kindergarten.612  During the meeting, Doe revealed to the coun-
selor that every day after school when her mother was gone, her stepfather, 
Tibor, touched her breasts and vagina.613  Following the meeting, the coun-
selor reported the allegations to social services and Doe was interviewed 
that same day.614  In the interview, Doe stated that Tibor touched her breasts 
and vagina with his hands and that these incidents took place “after school 
in her bedroom, the laundry room, Tibor’s bedroom, and the basement 
living room, when her mother was at work.”615 
On December 13, 2005, Doe underwent a sexual assault exam, during 
which she stated that Tibor touched her vagina with his fingers several 
times a month and even more than once a week at times.616  She also stated 
that after Tibor touched her, it would sometimes hurt when she would 
urinate.617  The doctor performing the exam found an approximately four 
millimeter long tear on Doe’s vagina, which was consistent with the 
allegations.618 
Based on these allegations, Tibor was charged with one count of gross 
sexual imposition.619  Later, the charge was increased to five counts of 
gross sexual imposition for the alleged abuse of Doe from August 1, 2005 
through December 10, 2005.620  The charges were brought under Sections 
12.1-20-03(2)(a) and 12.1-20-03(1)(d) of the North Dakota Century 
Code.621 
Prior to trial, the State announced that it planned to call Paula Condol 
as an expert witness to testify as to the “typical behaviors of sexually 
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Alonna Norberg as an expert witness to testify whether Doe’s genital abra-
sion was consistent with her allegations.623  Additionally, the State intended 
to present hearsay testimony, comprised of out-of-court statements made by 
Doe.624 
Tibor brought a motion in limine to exclude Condol’s testimony be-
cause it would confuse the jury and be prejudicial.625  Tibor also objected to 
the State’s use of hearsay testimony.626  The district court denied the motion 
in limine finding that the testimony could aid the jury in “understanding the 
evidence or determining the facts in issue.”627  A hearing was held as to the 
admissibility of the hearsay testimony.628  The court found the statements 
admissible because the requirements of Rule 803(24) of the North Dakota 
Rules of Evidence, regarding statements made by children as to sexual 
abuse, had been met.629 
A jury trial was then held from July 31, 2006 to August 2, 2006.630  At 
the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Tibor guilty on two of the five 
counts and acquitted him of the remaining three counts.631  Tibor was con-
victed of Count 4, which alleged that “Tibor inserted his tongue into Doe’s 
vulva,” and Count 5, which alleged that “Tibor touched Doe’s vagina with 
his finger.”632  Ultimately, “Tibor was sentenced to twelve years in 
prison.”633 
On appeal, Tibor argued that the district court abused its discretion in 
allowing Condol’s testimony regarding child sexual abuse accommodation 
syndrome.634  The North Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged that it had 
never decided whether a district court’s allowance of testimony of child 
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome amounted to an abuse of discre-
tion.635  Other courts have addressed the issue, however, and determined 
that expert witnesses may testify as to “typical behaviors or characteristics 
of sexually abused children and whether a specific victim exhibits symp-
toms consistent with sexual abuse.”636  However, courts must be careful to 
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prevent an expert from vouching for a “child victim’s credibility” when 
allowing this type of expert testimony.637 
Based on the reasoning of these other courts, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court concluded that a district court does not abuse its discretion 
when it allows testimony regarding child sexual abuse accommodation 
syndrome as long as the testimony could help a jury understand the evi-
dence.638  The court reasoned that the district court’s decision to allow 
Condol’s testimony in this case was appropriate because Condol was quali-
fied as an expert and the testimony could assist the jury’s understanding of 
the evidence.639  The court further found that the district court did not reach 
its decision in an “arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner.”640  
Therefore, the court held that the district court’s decision did not constitute 
an abuse of discretion.641 
Tibor next argued, however, that in Condol’s testimony, she “vouched 
for Doe’s credibility and testified she believed Doe had been abused.”642  In 
the State’s disclosure of the witness, the State stated that it intended to use 
Condol’s testimony to analyze whether Doe’s behaviors were typical of 
children that had been sexually abused.643  Furthermore, the State indicated 
that it did not plan to ask Condol if she believed Doe had been sexually 
abused.644  Tibor argued that the State exceeded the scope of its disclosure 
when it allowed Condol to testify that she believed Doe had been abused 
because it invaded the province of the jury.645  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court found, however, that although Condol’s testimony supported a 
determination that Doe had been abused, the possibility that Doe had not 
been truthful in her testimony continued to remain.646  Therefore, the court 
determined that Condol’s testimony was appropriate and did not invade the 
jury’s province.647 
Tibor further argued that it was inconsistent to allow the State to 
present expert testimony to analyze whether Doe’s behavior was consistent 
with the typical behavior of sexually abused children.648  Pursuant to State 
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v. Austin,649 Tibor, as a criminal defendant, was not allowed to present 
expert testimony regarding his alleged sexual interest in young girls.650  In 
Austin, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed a district court’s decision 
to exclude a criminal defendant’s use of expert testimony as to whether he 
was sexually interested in children.651  The court determined that the district 
court’s explanation as to the exclusion of the evidence was not arbitrary, 
unreasonable, or unconscionable; therefore, it was not an abuse of discre-
tion.652  In this case, the court also held that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion.653 
Tibor next argued that the district court’s decision to allow expert 
witnesses to testify about Doe’s change in demeanor during her interview 
with a social worker was an abuse of discretion because the testimony con-
stituted hearsay and the State failed to disclose it in the pretrial notice.654  
Additionally, Tibor claimed that this testimony was cumulative and 
prevented him from effectively cross-examining Doe because it was too 
prejudicial.655 
The North Dakota Supreme Court indicated that Doe’s nonverbal 
conduct had been offered as evidence of her demeanor and attitude.656  The 
court looked to Rule 801 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, which 
provided that nonverbal conduct could be offered as evidence without con-
stituting hearsay if it was not intended as an assertion.657  Therefore, the 
court found that the testimony regarding Doe’s demeanor was not hearsay 
and the district court’s decision to admit the evidence was not an abuse of 
discretion.658  As to Tibor’s argument that the testimony was “cumulative 
and unfairly prejudicial,” the court determined that while the testimony was 
repetitious, this mere repetition did not make the statements unduly preju-
dicial.659  Therefore, the court found that the district court’s decision to 
admit the evidence of Doe’s demeanor did not amount to an abuse of 
discretion.660 
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Tibor’s final argument on appeal asserted that the evidence in the 
record was not sufficient to sustain his conviction of two counts of gross 
sexual imposition.661  Tibor argued that he was innocent based on Doe’s 
inconsistent statements regarding the abuse.662  Additionally, Tibor con-
tended that he was not responsible for Doe’s genital abrasion because Doe’s 
physical examination took place five days after the last alleged episode of 
abuse and the doctor testified that the “abrasion was probably more than 24-
48 hours old and would heal quickly.”663  Tiber further claimed that he 
“proved he did not have time to abuse Doe.”664 
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that enough evidence had been 
presented so that Tibor was not convicted on all five counts of gross sexual 
imposition for which he had been charged.665  However, the court noted that 
sufficient evidence had been presented to charge him with two of those 
counts.666  Tibor was charged with “inserting his tongue into Doe’s vulva 
and for using his finger to touch Doe’s vagina.”667  Evidence was presented 
through Doe’s testimony that Tibor had touched her in these ways and that 
the abuse occurred when her mother was not home.668  Evidence was also 
presented that Doe and her siblings were home alone with Tibor at times 
and Doe’s brothers testified that during these times, Doe was sometimes 
alone in a room with Tibor and the door was locked or closed.669  The 
doctor that performed the sexual assault exam on Doe also testified that 
Doe’s genital abrasion was consistent with the sexual abuse allegations.670  
Furthermore, expert testimony was presented that Doe’s behavior was 
consistent with the behavior typically exhibited by children that had been 
sexually abused.671 
Based on the evidence in the record, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
concluded that sufficient evidence was present to sustain Tibor’s convic-
tions for gross sexual imposition.672  The court therefore affirmed the dis-
trict court’s judgment.673 
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FAMILY LAW—CHILD SUPPORT—COMPUTATION OF SUPPORT 
OBLIGATIONS 
CLINE V. CLINE 
In Cline v. Cline,674 the Minot Regional Child Support Enforcement 
Unit (Unit) appealed the district court’s “July 28, 2006 Second Amended 
Judgment,” which set David Cline’s child support.675  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court held that the district court’s failure to compute David 
Cline’s child support obligation according to the child support guidelines 
was an error.676  The court therefore reversed and remanded the case for a 
redetermination of the child support obligation under the guidelines.677 
In 1997, David and Sharon Cline divorced and Sharon received 
custody of their two minor children.678  David was ordered to pay child 
support in an amount calculated by the court through the use of the child 
support guidelines.679  The court then adjusted David’s support obligation 
based on his “extended visitation with the children and his travel costs,” 
thereby giving him a “two-month credit against his annual support 
obligation.”680 
In 2002, Sharon requested and was granted permission to move to Iowa 
with the children.681  At that time, David’s monthly obligation was in-
creased to $602 based on an increased income and he continued to receive 
the annual credit.682  An amended judgment incorporated these provisions 
into the parties’ stipulation.683 
In 2006, Sharon requested that the Unit review David’s child support 
obligation.684  The Unit motioned that David’s obligation be increased 
based on changes in his income.685  The Unit and David stipulated that his 
monthly net income was $3,234, which would amount to a monthly support 
obligation of $920 without accounting for any deviations.686  The Unit 
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claimed that deviations from the guidelines must be calculated under 
relevant provisions of the guidelines.687  David, however, argued that he 
should be allowed to receive the credit provided in the prior stipulation.688 
The district court determined that David “should continue to receive a 
two-month credit against his support obligation.”689  In arriving at this deci-
sion, the district court noted that the credit had been determined based on 
the increased expenses David would have incurred when Sharon moved to 
Iowa.690  Therefore, the district court continued the two-month credit of 
David’s child support obligation and recalculated the obligation.691 
The Unit appealed the district court’s decision.692  The Unit argued that 
the district court’s failure to comply with the child support guidelines 
pursuant to chapter 75-02-04.1 of the North Dakota Administrative Code in 
calculating David’s obligation was an error.693  In child support determina-
tions, “[a] court errs as a matter of law when it fails to comply with the 
requirements of the child support guidelines in determining an obligor’s 
child support obligation.”694 
In this case, the court acknowledged the district court’s power to 
modify earlier child support orders.695  However, the court noted that courts 
cannot order a reduced support obligation that fails to comply with the child 
support guidelines.696  Therefore, the court found that the district court had 
erred as a matter of law when it failed to compute David’s support obliga-
tion according to the child support guidelines.697 
Under the child support guidelines, specific provisions exist regarding 
“deviations for extended visitation and travel expenses related to [the] exer-
cise of visitation.”698  Specifically, Section 75-02-04.1-08.1 of the North 
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adjust a child support obligation upon an award of extended visitation to an 
obligor.699  Furthermore, subsection (2) of this provision contains a com-
plex formula to use to calculate deviations from child support based on the 
length of visitation in the court order.700 
When extended visitation is present, “the district court must adjust the 
amount of child support to reflect that visitation in accordance with the 
guideline formula.”701  In this case, David’s visitation undisputedly satisfied 
the guideline’s definition of extended visitation.702  Therefore, David’s 
child support obligation must be adjusted in accordance with Section 75-02-
04.1-08.1 of the North Dakota Administrative Code.703 
The child support guidelines also specifically provide for deviations 
from support obligations when obligors have “a reduced ability to pay due 
to travel expenses incurred for child visitation” in Section 75-02-04.1-
09(2)(i).704  The guidelines provide that in these situations, the travel ex-
penses are to be “subtracted from the obligor’s net income before calcu-
lating the support obligation.”705  In this case, the district court awarded 
David a two-month credit towards his annual support obligation instead of 
using the child support guidelines to determine the appropriate adjustment 
amount.706  Ultimately, the court must follow the provisions in the child 
support guidelines as to David’s “scheduled extended visitation and related 
travel expenses.”707 
On appeal, David argued that the district court’s judgment should be 
upheld.708  He claimed that the child support award was “at least 85 percent 
of the calculated amount under the guidelines” and cited Section 14-09-
08.4(3) of the North Dakota Century Code in support of this argument.709  
The court however indicated that this statute did not expressly or implicitly 
allow “child support awards that deviate less than 15 percent from the 
calculated support obligation under the guidelines.”710  Instead, it merely 
establishes a line below which child support agencies are required to “seek 
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an amendment of court-ordered support.”711  Furthermore, this section 
specifically requires that support awards be calculated in accordance with 
the child support guidelines.712 
Ultimately, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the district 
court’s computation of David’s child support obligation was an error as a 
matter of law.713  Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the case to 
redetermine David’s child support obligation under the child support guide-
lines.714 
PROBATE LAW AND ESTATE ADMINISTRATION—NOTICE TO 
CREDITORS—REASONABLE DILIGENCE STANDARD 
ESTATE OF GILBERT ELKEN, JR. 
Lorry Larson appealed a district court judgment which denied his 
claims against the decedent’s estate.715  The North Dakota Supreme Court 
found that the district court misapplied the law when it determined that 
Larson was not a reasonably ascertainable creditor pursuant to Section 30.1-
19-01 of the North Dakota Century Code, thereby finding Larson’s claims 
untimely.716  The court ultimately held that Larson was a reasonably 
ascertainable creditor and remanded the case for further proceedings on 
Larson’s claims.717 
The decedent was granted a life estate in a house in Mayville, North 
Dakota in February 1999.718  The decedent lived in the house until July 
2002, upon which time he moved into a nursing home in Mayville where he 
remained until his death on February 16, 2005.719  A guardian served on the 
decedent’s behalf during this time.720 
After a pipe broke in the decedent’s house in 2004 and caused water 
damage, Larson made the repairs.721  Larson then submitted a bill to the 
decedent’s guardian and indicated that all of the necessary repairs had not 
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been made.722  Larson acknowledged that the decedent’s guardian had 
always indicated a willingness to pay for any additional damages.723 
Following the decedent’s death, the personal representative of his 
estate published “a notice to creditors in the Traill County Tribune for three 
successive weeks in April 2005.”724  This notice provided that any credi-
tor’s claim, which was not presented to the personal representative of the 
decedent’s estate within three months of publication, would be barred.725  A 
copy of the notice was not mailed to Larson, who was a California resi-
dent.726  Over a year later, Larson sought compensation for repairs made to 
the decedent’s house and “filed claims against the decedent’s estate on May 
12, May 23, June 26, and June 30, 2006” which were denied by the 
personal representative.727 
Larson petitioned the district court to allow his claims.728  The parties 
then presented affidavits and agreed to have the court decide the case based 
on the record.729  The district court denied the claims “concluding they were 
not submitted to the personal representative within three months after the 
publication of the notice to creditors” pursuant to North Dakota Century 
Code Section 30.1-19-03(1).730  The district court determined that Larson 
was not “a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor” under Section 30.1-
19-01.731  In making its decision, the court looked to the legislature’s intent 
under Section 30.1-19-01 and defined “a reasonably ascertainable creditor” 
as a “creditor who regularly submits billings.”732  The court determined that 
Larson’s claims did not fit into this narrow definition and ultimately denied 
the claims.733 
Upon appeal, Larson argued that the district court erred in finding his 
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the North Dakota Century Code provides that creditor claims against a 
decedent’s estate, which arise prior to the decedent’s death, are barred 
unless the presentment of the claims occurs within three months of the first 
publication and mailing of notice under Section 30.1-19-01; or, if notice to 
creditors is not published or mailed, presentment of the claims occurs 
within three years of the date of the decedent’s death.735 
Larson argued that the district court erred in its decision that Larson 
was not entitled to actual notice by erroneously limiting the definition of a 
reasonably ascertainable creditor as a person who regularly submits billing 
statements.736  Larson further argued that the court erred in its interpretation 
of the term “includes” as a term of limitation.737  Finally, Larson argued that 
this interpretation ignored the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope,738 which imposed a 
due process requirement on personal representatives to make “reasonably 
diligent efforts to uncover the identities of creditors.”739 
The North Dakota Supreme Court began its decision by addressing the 
use of the term “includes.”740  The court noted that when used in a statutory 
definition, the term “includes” has consistently been interpreted as a word 
of enlargement, not a term of limitation.741  Specifically, the court acknowl-
edged that the use of the term “includes” in defining a reasonably ascertain-
able creditor as one who regularly submits billing, is “a definition of en-
largement and not of limitation.”742 
The mailed notice requirement for reasonably ascertainable creditors 
provided for in Section 30.1-19-01 of the North Dakota Century Code was 
enacted in response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Pope.743  In Pope, the Supreme Court held that a notice provision for claims 
in probate requiring only notice by publication, did not satisfy the due 
process requirement that reasonably ascertainable creditors must receive 
actual notice.744  The Court determined that a personal representative satis-
fies this due process requirement by using “reasonably diligent efforts” to 
establish the identities of reasonably ascertainable creditors.745  However, 
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for creditors that are not reasonably ascertainable, notice by publication is 
sufficient.746  Based on this decision and rules of statutory construction, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court held that under Section 30.1-19-01, a reason-
ably ascertainable creditor can be uncovered by a personal representative 
through reasonably diligent efforts.747 
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that the district court’s 
interpretation of a reasonably ascertainable creditor under Section 30.1-19-
01, was contrary to the decision in Pope and the principle that the term “in-
cludes” is a term of enlargement and not of limitation when used in a defi-
nition.748  The district court determined that Larson was not entitled to the 
mailed notice given to creditors because he was not a reasonably ascertain-
able creditor in that he did not regularly submit billings to the decedent or 
the decedent’s estate.749  The North Dakota Supreme Court found that this 
determination was based on an erroneous and limiting interpretation of 
Section 30.1-19-01 and concluded that the district court misapplied the law 
in its interpretation of a reasonably ascertainable creditor.750 
Additionally, the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the parties’ 
arguments regarding whether the personal representative could have dis-
covered Larson’s claims by contacting the decedent’s guardian and inquir-
ing into the decedent’s financial affairs.751  These arguments raised the 
question as to whether the determination of a reasonably ascertainable 
creditor involves an inquiry into the facts of the case.752  This inquiry turns 
upon what constitutes reasonable due diligence on the part of the personal 
representative.753 
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that Section 30.1-18-15(27) 
imposes a duty on personal representatives to “satisfy and settle any claims 
against an estate.”754  Additionally, Section 30.1-28-12 provides guardians 
with the authority to deal with their ward’s property.755  According to the 
court, these provisions require a personal representative to inquire as to the 
state of a decedent’s financial affairs, such as by contacting a known 
 
746. Id.  The Court reasoned that it was reasonable to dispense with the actual notice require-
ment for those creditors with merely conjectural claims.  Id. 
747. Id. 
748. Id. ¶ 10, 735 N.W.2d at 847. 
749. Id. 
750. Id. 
751. Id. ¶ 11. 
752. Id. ¶ 12. 
753. See id. ¶ 13, 735 N.W.2d at 847-48 (explaining that a personal representative has the 
duty to satisfy claims against an estate and to use reasonably diligent efforts in this process). 
754. Id. at 847. 
755. Id. 
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guardian as to the decedent’s financial affairs.756  Therefore, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court concluded that Larson was a reasonably ascertain-
able potential creditor who could have been found through reasonably dili-
gent efforts, specifically if the personal representative had contacted the 
decedent’s guardian.757  As a result, the court found that Larson’s claims 
were not time barred and remanded the case for further proceedings on the 
claims.758 
TORT LAW—STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS—SHOWING GOOD 
CAUSE 
SCHEER V. ALTRU HEALTH SYSTEM 
Loretta Scheer appealed a district court judgment, which dismissed her 
claim of professional negligence.759  The district court dismissed the claim 
for failing to serve an expert affidavit within the three month statute of 
limitations.760  An exception to dismissal for failing to meet this statute of 
limitations is provided in Section 28-01-46 of the North Dakota Century 
Code, but this exception is only appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates 
good cause.761  The North Dakota Supreme Court held that “a plaintiff may 
move for good cause as late as in response to [a] defendant’s motion to 
dismiss.”762  Based on this holding, the court reversed and remanded the 
district court’s decision to decide whether Scheer demonstrated good cause 
to support an extension.763 
In February 2004, Scheer sought treatment for abdominal pain at Altru 
Health System.764  Dr. Leslie Sullivan performed surgery on Scheer’s 
gallbladder on March 4, 2004 at the Altru facility.765  Scheer was dis-
charged from Altru on March 5, 2004.766  That evening, however, Scheer 
experienced “‘crampy abdominal pain’ and ‘felt something pull.’”767  On 
March 8, 2004, Scheer told Dr. Sullivan about these symptoms.768  On 
March 10, 2004, Dr. Sullivan performed another surgery on the area and 
 
756. Id. 
757. Id. at 847-48. 
758. Id. at 848. 
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“placed a drain in Scheer’s bile duct.”769  Scheer experienced further prob-
lems and was transferred to a Fargo hospital, then to the Mayo Clinic on 
March 12, 2004.770  While at the Mayo Clinic, doctors told Scheer that “part 
of her bile duct had been surgically removed.”771 
On March 9, 2006, Scheer filed a complaint in district court, which 
claimed that Sullivan negligently performed Scheer’s gallbladder opera-
tion.772  The court also found, for purposes of the appeal, that Altru Health 
System was served on March 9, 2006 and Dr. Sullivan was served on 
March 13, 2006.773  On July 12, 2006, both Dr. Sullivan and Altru Health 
System moved to dismiss the claim because Scheer allegedly failed under 
Section 28-01-46, “to serve them with an admissible expert affidavit.”774  
The parties filed the motion with the district court on July 17, 2006 and 
Scheer requested additional time to respond to the parties’ motion to 
dismiss.775  That same day, Scheer sent a letter to Dr. Sullivan and Altru.776  
The letter was written by Dr. Jeffry Snow on March 1, 2006 and contained 
his opinion that the operation performed by Dr. Sullivan fell below the 
appropriate standard of care.777  On July 24, 2006, Scheer’s request for 
additional time to respond to the motion to dismiss was granted by the 
district court.778 
On August 15, 2006, Scheer responded to the motion and on August 
25, 2006, Scheer served Altru and Dr. Sullivan with an affidavit from Dr. 
Snow.779  In his affidavit, Dr. Snow opined that Dr. Sullivan performed 
Scheer’s operation below the standard of care.780  Specifically, Dr. Snow 
stated that Dr. Sullivan mistakenly cut and clipped the common bile duct 
instead of the cystic duct.781 
The district court dismissed Scheer’s lawsuit on October 17, 2006 
without prejudice because Scheer “failed to timely serve the expert affida-





772. Id. ¶ 3. 
773. Id. 





779. Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 734 N.W.2d at 780-81. 
780. Id. ¶ 5, 734 N.W.2d at 781. 
781. Id. 
782. Id. ¶ 6. 
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Appeals decision of Weasel v. St. Alexius Medical Center,783 which inter-
preted the 1997 version of Section 28-01-46 of the North Dakota Century 
Code.784  In this decision, the Eighth Circuit held that a motion for good 
cause by a plaintiff can only be granted if the motion is filed “prior to [a] 
[d]efendant filing a [m]otion to [d]ismiss for failure to obtain an expert 
opinion within three months.”785  The district court concluded under this 
holding that Scheer’s request for an extension was too late and dismissed 
her claim without prejudice.786 
On appeal, Scheer argued that the district court’s dismissal of her claim 
without prejudice could be appealed because if she were to find that the 
three month period lapsed, she would not be able to relitigate her claim.787  
The 2005 version of Section 28-01-46 provides in part: 
Any action for injury or death alleging professional negligence by 
a physician, . . . hospital, . . . must be dismissed without prejudice 
on motion unless the plaintiff serves upon the defendant an 
affidavit containing an admissible expert opinion to support a 
prima facie case of professional negligence within three months of 
the commencement of the action.  The court may set a later date for 
serving the affidavit for good cause shown by the plaintiff.788 
Scheer argued that the district court erred in interpreting Section 28-01-
46 because the statute does not state that a plaintiff must show good cause 
before the expiration of the three month period or ask for an extension prior 
to the defendant’s motion to dismiss.789  Additionally, Scheer claimed that 
the decision should be remanded to consider whether she had good cause 
for an extension.790 
The North Dakota Supreme Court began its decision by analyzing 
Section 28-01-46.  The court first stated that Section 28-01-46 creates an 
affirmative defense and contains two exceptions.791  First, the time within 
which the plaintiff must serve the expert affidavit can be extended upon a 
showing of good cause by the plaintiff.792  Second, if the injury at issue is 
 
783. 230 F.3d 348 (8th Cir. 2000). 
784. Scheer, ¶ 6, 734 N.W.2d at 781. 
785. Id. (citing Weasel, 230 F.3d at 353). 
786. Id. 
787. Id. ¶ 8. 
788. Id. ¶ 10, 734 N.W.2d at 781-82 (quoting 2005 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 280, § 1) (emphasis 
in original). 
789. Id. ¶ 15. 
790. Id. 
791. Id. ¶¶ 19-20, 734 N.W.2d at 783-84. 
792. Id. ¶ 20, 734 N.W.2d at 784. 
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an obvious occurrence, an expert affidavit is not required.793  The second 
exception was not at issue because Scheer did not contend that her injury 
amounted to an obvious occurrence.794 
Pursuant to Section 28-01-46, if good cause is shown, a court may 
choose to grant or deny a plaintiff’s request for an extension to serve his or 
her expert affidavit before the three month period expires.795  Once the three 
month period expires, however, the case becomes “eligible for dismissal 
without prejudice.”796  However, the statute does not indicate when or how 
a plaintiff is able to avoid dismissal by showing good cause for an extension 
to serve the expert affidavit.797  Instead, a plaintiff is not able to show good 
cause once the case is dismissed because the case is no longer pending upon 
dismissal.798  Furthermore, this section is only intended to apply before 
trial, not during trial and does not require a defendant to move to dismiss 
immediately upon the lapse of the three month period.799 
Section 28-01-46 places the burden of proof on the plaintiff to demon-
strate good cause.800  Scheduling conferences may provide an opportunity 
for plaintiffs to motion for good cause for an extension.801  Additionally, 
since the section serves as an affirmative defense for defendants, defendants 
may choose not to assert the defense and reach an agreement with the 
plaintiff to set a different deadline for service of the expert affidavit.802  
However, agreement between the parties is not necessary if sufficient good 
cause is presented by the plaintiff.803  If an agreement is reached between 
the parties, the scheduling order must clearly reflect such agreement and 
specify the new deadline for service of the expert affidavit.804 
Furthermore, the exception requires that the plaintiff demonstrate good 
cause prior to the dismissal of the case.805  It is possible that a defendant can 
file a motion to dismiss long after the three month period lapses.806  




795. Id. ¶ 21. 
796. Id. ¶ 22. 
797. Id. ¶ 23. 
798. Id. 
799. Id. ¶¶ 23-24. 
800. Id. ¶ 25 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-46 (2001)). 




805. Id. ¶ 26. 
806. Id. 
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to dismiss.807  Therefore, “the latest a plaintiff could show good cause 
would be in response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss.”808 
In applying the statute to the facts in this case, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court applied the plain meaning of the statute.809  In this case, 
Scheer’s complaint was served on Altru Health System on March 9, 2006 
and on Dr. Sullivan on March 13, 2006.810  The district court found that the 
latest date upon which Scheer’s three month period would lapse would be 
on June 13, 2006.811  Over a month after the statutory period lapsed on July 
17, 2006, Dr. Sullivan and Altru asserted their affirmative defense and filed 
a motion to dismiss Scheer’s claim.812  The district court granted Scheer an 
extension to respond to the motion and Scheer served the expert affidavit on 
August 25, 2006.813 
Ultimately, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the 
district court misapplied the Eighth Circuit’s Court of Appeals interpreta-
tion of Section 28-01-46 in Weasel.814  As a result, the district court dismis-
sed Scheer’s claim without determining the existence of good cause.815  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court stressed that whether Scheer demonstrated 
good cause for an extension in her response was a question to be decided by 
the trier of fact.816  As a result, the district court’s decision was reversed and 
remanded for a determination of good cause.817 
Justice Kapsner concurred in the result but did not furnish a separate 
opinion.818  Justice Crothers’ dissented with the majority’s opinion.819  In 
Justice Crothers’ opinion, the majority did not follow the legislative man-
dates requiring that statutes be interpreted according to their plain meaning 
or the mandate in the controlling statute in this case, Section 28-01-46.820 
Justice Crothers provided that Section 28-01-46 is clear in its mandate 
that a plaintiff’s claim be dismissed if the affidavit is not “served within 
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819. Id. ¶ 29. 
820. Id. ¶ 30. 
821. Id. ¶ 31, 734 N.W.2d at 786. 
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that in this case an affidavit was required and Scheer both failed to meet the 
three-month deadline and failed to request an extension before the defen-
dants filed a motion to dismiss.822  Therefore, in Justice Crothers’ opinion, 
Scheer’s claim was properly dismissed under Section 28-01-46.823 
Justice Crothers asserted that the majority focused its opinion on the 
fact that the defendants did not immediately move to dismiss the claim 
following the three month lapse.824  Instead, Justice Crothers argued that in 
this case, the defendants’ failure to immediately motion to dismiss the 
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